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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world economy has still being struggling to recover since the 2007-2008 
world-wide financial and economic crises. At this stage, besides slow economic 
recovery and high unemployment rate, many countries have encountered problems of 
public finances as well. This provokes economists and policy makers to think further 
about the relationship between public finances and business cycles, and also try to 
forecast the long-run trend of fiscal balances for these countries. 
The long-run trend of fiscal balances, formally known  as structural fiscal 
balances (SFB), are calculated when transitory components are removed from fiscal 
revenues and expenditures. Cyclically adjusted fiscal balances are commonly 
employed, which refers to the difference between the trend levels of fiscal aggregates 
when only the cyclical effect of output gap is considered. Recently especially after the 
Great Recession, more other factors are supposed to have significant influences on 
fiscal aggregates, such as inflation, asset prices and terms of trade (Bornhorst et al., 
2011). In this paper, structural fiscal balances are defined as the difference between 
the trend levels of aggregate fiscal revenue and aggregate government expenditure. 
For nominal government expenditure, I only adjust it one-to-one to the cycle of 
aggregate price level and ignore other cyclical factors’ influences on it, since real 
government expenditure is discretionary and fiscal economists always assume zero 
elasticity of it with respect to cyclical factors, such as in Bornhorst et at. (2011). 
This paper criticizes the traditional elasticity-trend methodology, and proposes a 
new framework to analyze structural fiscal balances and the relationship between 
public finances and business cycles. The effects of various shocks, including the 
technology shock, the stock market shock, foreign real and nominal shocks and 
domestic policy shocks, on aggregate fiscal revenue and their propagation 
mechanisms are examined in detail. Trends and cycles of aggregate variables, 
including structural fiscal balances, can be extracted from data simultaneously. To be 
specific, a small open-economy New Keynesian DSGE model with exogenous growth, 
stock market, and fiscal and monetary policies is constructed, stochastic trends are 
properly incorporated, Bayesian method is employed to estimate the model, and the  
numerical solution of the DSGE model serves as part of the Kalman smoother to do 
the signal extraction. 
The UK economy is taken as an example in this paper. Bayesian estimation 
results indicate that for the UK economy a setting of integrated random walk for the 
underlying stochastic trends of the economy fits the date best. The impulse response 
analysis reveals the basic relationship between aggregate fiscal revenue and business 
cycles. The transmission mechanism of various shocks’ effect on nominal fiscal 
revenue is explained by two main channels: the real channel through real GDP which 
can be viewed as the real tax base of fiscal revenue, and the nominal channel through 
the aggregate price level. Although in the medium term the response of nominal fiscal 
revenue to the technology shock is positive, the effect is not big. Both of the foreign 
shocks, the shock to foreign demand and the shock to foreign goods price, have 
positive effects on fiscal revenue. An expansionary monetary policy shock would 
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have a great positive short-run impact on nominal fiscal revenue, but the influence is 
not persistent because of the open-economy characteristic of the UK. An expansion in 
government spending can also increase nominal fiscal revenue to a certain degree, but 
the effect is not persistent as well due to two kinds of crowd-out effects generated by 
an increase of government spending: it crowds out domestic investment, and it pushes 
up the price of domestic goods and simultaneously crowds out foreign demand. The 
shock to the stock price has no effect on fiscal revenue. The forecast error variance 
decomposition of the fiscal revenue cycle tells that: the shocks to the nominal interest 
rate, foreign output and the government spending are the three major contributors to 
the variation of the fiscal revenue cycle; the shock to the foreign price makes some 
contribution to the fluctuation of the fiscal revenue cycle; and the shocks to the 
temporary productivity and stock price are of very minor importance. 
We also discuss the public finances of the UK in the post Great Recession period 
when both the economic recovery and the fiscal sustainability should be taken into 
consideration. Generally speaking, it is not an appropriate choice to adopt an 
expansionary fiscal policy by either increasing the government expenditure or cutting 
the lump-sum tax. An expansionary fiscal policy will deteriorate the fiscal stance 
(higher government debt-GDP ratio or higher fiscal deficit) as well as harm the 
economic recovery in the medium term. On the contrary, a contractionary fiscal policy 
(cutting the government expenditure or a temporary increase of the lump-sum tax) 
will benefit both the economic recovery and the fiscal stance. Compared to a 
temporary increase of the lump-sum tax, cutting the government spending is relatively 
more effective and it alleviates both the domestic and external crowd-out effects 
generated by the government spending. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review of relevant 
literature. Section 3 is the theoretical framework of our approach to analyze structural 
fiscal balances. In section 4 we do the Bayesian estimation of our DSGE model, and 
then the signal extraction of the fiscal revenue cycle and structural fiscal balances is 
achieved. Section 5 explores the relationship between fiscal revenue and business 
cycles in detail, and tries to uncover the transmission mechanisms of various shocks’ 
impacts on fiscal revenue. Robustness checks are implemented in Section 6, in order 
to see whether the results about signal extraction, impulse response analysis and 
variance decomposition are sensitive or not to our calibration. Section 7 is a policy 
evaluation of public finances for the UK in the post Great Recession period. Finally in 
section 8 we conclude. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Estimating structural fiscal balances is of special interest to national treasuries of 
many countries and international institutions such as IMF, ECB, and OECD. 
Normally there are three steps to estimate structural fiscal balances: first, identify and 
remove one-off fiscal operations such as public expenditure on a natural disaster; 
secondly, assess the impact of the business cycle (output gap) on fiscal revenue and 
expenditure; finally, estimate the effects of other factors. In practice, the second and 
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third steps can be done together, using the elasticity-trend approach. 
The elasticity-trend approach consists of three further steps: first estimate the 
fiscal revenue and expenditure elasticities with respect to real output and other factors; 
then do the trend-cycle decomposition for these factors; finally calculate the trend 
levels of fiscal revenue and expenditure and then structural fiscal balances, using the 
estimated elasticities and the trend levels of real output and other factors.  
Among the existing literature, fiscal elasticities with respect to different factors, 
such as output gap, asset prices, commodity price and terms of trade, and inflation, are 
investigated broadly. Girouard and André (2005) discuss the cyclically adjusted 
budget balances for OECD countries in detail. Aydin (2010) studies the case of South 
Africa, with an emphasis on the effects of commodity and asset prices, and the credit 
cycle as well. Terms of trade
1
 may have a negative effect on fiscal revenue, especially 
for commodity exporter countries. Price and Dang (2011) explain the necessity of 
incorporating the asset prices effects when removing the transitory components of 
fiscal balances, and provides an econometric method to estimate structural fiscal 
balances for OECD countries. This econometric approach is an 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿 1,1,1,… ,1  
model, which can be used to estimate both the short-run and long-run fiscal 
elasticities with respect to output and asset prices.  
 
Table 1. Short run and long run fiscal revenue elasticities for the UK  
Elasticities EC parameter Real GDP GDP deflator Terms of trade Financial stress 
Short run 0 1.30 1.16 0 0 
Long run  0.35 1.48 -0.44 0.005 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Note: zero in the table means the corresponding estimated elasticity (or parameter) is not 
significant at the significance level of 10%. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The HP trends of real GDP and GDP deflator for the UK according to the HP 
filtering method (lambda=100 for annual data) 
 
Table 1 lists the short run and long run fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to 
various factors according to an 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿 model, for the UK. Figure 1 depicts the trends 
of real GDP and GDP deflator resulting from the HP filtering method. Consequently, 
                                                           
1 In this paper, terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the imported goods price over the exported goods price. 
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the trend and the cycle of fiscal revenue (and then structural fiscal balances) can be 
calculated and are shown in Figure 2, following the elasticity-trend approach. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The trend and the cycle of fiscal revenue for the UK according to the 
elasticity-trend approach 
 
Besides the elasticity-trend approach which is most widely used, some other 
econometric methods such as structural VAR are sometimes used to estimate 
structural fiscal balances as well. There are several obvious shortcomings of using 
such empirical models to estimate fiscal elasticities and calculate structural fiscal 
balances. First of all, the propagation mechanisms of transitory effects on fiscal 
aggregates are not clear. Secondly, there is a risk of over adjusting. Third, fiscal 
elasticities and trend levels are estimated separately, and there is a problem of 
inconsistency. For example, the HP filter is broadly used to get the trend levels of 
influencing factors, such as in the example given above, in order to calculate the trend 
level of fiscal revenue. The problem here is that: if one can justify the usage of the HP 
filter to de-trend GDP and other aggregate variables, why not using it to de-trend 
fiscal revenue directly? Figure 3 depicts the cycles of fiscal revenue for the UK, using 
the HP and structural time series model (STM) methods respectively,
2
 which are 
quite different from the cycle in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The cycles of fiscal revenue for the UK according to the HP and STM methods 
                                                           
2 For STM, refer to Harvey (1989) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993), and a smooth trend is employed here. We will 
discuss STM in detail in a coming part of the paper. The HP filtering method is in fact a special kind of STM.  
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Garratt et al. (2006) also criticize univariate pre-filtering procedures (such as the 
HP filter), and they present a derivation of multivariate Beveridge-Nelson trends from 
cointegrating vector autoregressive model. The multivariate Beveridge-Nelson trends 
are interpreted as conditional cointegrating equilibrium values, and the nature of the 
permanent and transitory components can be related to the nature of the error 
correction process, at both finite and infinite horizons. Similar to Garratt et al. (2006), 
Dees et al. (2010) use the long-horizon forecasts, provided by a global VAR model 
which takes account of unit roots and cointegration in the global economy, to model 
the permanent (trend) components of variables. Cointegrating relationships between 
trends can be modeled within the framework of multivariate structural time series 
model with common trends as well, as illustrated in Harvey (1989). And a 
multivariate structural time series model can be also utilized to explore the possible 
linear relationships between cycles, using common cycle settings. Either the 
multivariate Beveridge-Nelson approach of Garratt et al. (2006) or the multivariate 
structural time series model with common trends and common cycles is still a pure 
statistical model, and when they are used to de-trend nominal fiscal revenue and 
analyze structural fiscal balances, the propagation mechanisms of influencing factors 
on fiscal revenue are still a black box. 
So in this paper we will analyze and do the signal extraction of structural fiscal 
balances in a framework of DSGE modeling. In order to get rid of the de-trending 
problems explained above, we will incorporate stochastic trends in our DSGE model, 
and the cyclical components of aggregate variables and structural fiscal balances will 
be obtained from the data simultaneously.  
Why should we incorporate stochastic trends into a DSGE model? The common 
practice of bridging the DSGE models and the data is to eliminate trends altogether in 
the data --- ―pre-filter‖ them using such as the HP filter --- before estimating a model. 
This two-step approach is very problematic and criticized by Fukac and Pagan (2005),  
Ferroni (2011), Canova (2012) and Lafourcade and Wind (2012). In contrast to the 
two-step approach, An and Schorfheide (2007), Lafourcade and Wind (2012) and 
many other Bayesian DSGE papers incorporate stochastic trends into DSGE models 
and estimate the parameters regarding the whole system altogether, using Bayesian 
techniques. According to Ferroni (2011) and Canova (2012), joint estimation is 
unambiguously preferable to the two-step approach, since it can avoid problems 
ranging from trend misspecification to wrong cross-frequency correlation. They both 
suggest developing a flexible specification for trends in the observation equations and 
estimating them jointly with the cyclical theoretical model summarized in the 
transition equations.  
Trends can be brought into a DSGE model in several ways. In the literature of 
Bayesian DSGE models, a common practice is to assume a drifted random walk for 
the permanent technology (or productivity), as in An and Schorfheide (2007), 
Lafourcade and Wind (2012). And in the stochastic steady state, aggregate variables 
such as real GDP and consumption are driven by this same drifted-random-walk 
stochastic trend, which is an I(1) process. After removing this common stochastic 
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trend from the model economy, the system would be put into a stationary 
representation. Here it is in fact implicitly assumed that the balanced growth property 
of aggregate variables in the deterministic steady state is maintained in the stochastic 
steady state. Another way is as in Smets and Wouters (2007), assuming that all real 
variables in the model expand at the same deterministic rate, which directly reflects 
the property of a balanced growth path. This deterministic-trend approach can neither 
capture the observable fluctuations of the data properly nor reflect the complexity of 
the economic reality. Another alternative way to incorporate stochastic trends is using 
an integrated random walk model or local linear trend model, as in literature of the 
structural time series model (or unobserved components model). An integrated 
random walk or a local linear trend is an I(2) process. It is more flexible than a 
drifted-random-walk trend, and under some circumstance it can be reduced to a 
drifted random walk. 
While the Bayesian DSGE literature aims to better estimate structural parameters 
of the DSGE models by incorporating stochastic trends, the aim of this paper by 
incorporating stochastic trends is to better extract trends and cycles (particularly 
structural fiscal balances) from data and make the signal extraction consistent with the 
macroeconomic theory. In this paper, stochastic trends will be incorporated formally 
in a general equilibrium framework, and cross-equation restrictions that link transition 
and observation equations more tightly will be generated, thus resulting in a richer 
and theory-consistent correlation structure in the model. Stochastic trends are 
incorporated not only in the process of DSGE model estimation, but also embedded in 
the mechanism of the signal extraction of structural fiscal balances. It is the data that 
determines whether the underlying stochastic trends of the model economy are I(2) or 
I(1) processes. Section 3 below provides a theoretical open-economy DSGE model of 
structural fiscal balances. 
 
3. A MODEL OF STRUCTURAL FISCAL BALANCES 
 
The model is an open-economy DSGE model with economic growth, stock market, 
tax system and fiscal and monetary policies. And nominal fiscal revenue and then 
fiscal balances are endogenously determined. There is a continuum, with unity 
measure, of countries in the world, and the home country is one of them and thus of 
zero measure. 
 
3.1. Households 
 
3.1.1. Inter-temporal optimization 
 
In the home country it is assumed there is a continuum, with unity measure, of 
infinitely-living households. A representative household seeks to maximize his life 
time utility: 
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𝑈0 = 𝐸0  𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 𝜙 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 +  1− 𝜙 ∙ ln 1− 𝐿𝑡   
where 𝐸 is the expectation operator, 𝛽 is the utility discount factor, 𝜙 is the utility 
weight for consumption 𝐶𝑡 , and labour supply is 𝐿𝑡 . For tractability, we assume 
additively separable logarithmic utility.  
The representative household can invest in three assets: real capital 𝐾𝑡  which is 
used as a production factor with real rental rate 𝑟𝑡
1; government bond 𝐵𝑡  with 
nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡
2; and equity shares 𝑆𝑡(𝑖) of the firm 𝑖 which produces an 
intermediate good 𝑖 with dividend 𝐷𝑡(𝑖) and its share price 𝑄𝑡 (𝑖). As we will 
explain, there is a unit-measure continuum of differentiated intermediate goods, and 
each intermediate-goods firm has monopoly profit due to the monopolistic 
competition of intermediate-goods market. 
The government collects six kinds of taxes from households: labour income tax 
with rate 𝜏𝐿 , capital rental income tax with rate 𝜏𝐾 , consumption tax with rate 𝜏𝐶 , 
bond interest income tax with rate 𝜏𝐵 , share dividend tax with rate 𝜏𝐷 , and nominal 
lump-sum tax 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡 . Therefore, the budget constraint for the household is:  
 1 + 𝜏𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡+1 𝑖 ∙ 𝑄𝑡  𝑖 
1
0
𝑑𝑖 
       =  1 − 𝛿 +  1 − 𝜏𝐾 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 +  1− 𝜏𝐿 ∙ 𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡                         
                    + 1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡−1
2  ∙ 𝐵𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡 𝑖 ∙ [𝑄𝑡  𝑖 + (1− 𝜏𝐷)
1
0
∙ 𝐷𝑡 𝑖 ]𝑑𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑃𝑡  is the aggregate price level of the final good, 𝛿 is the capital depreciation 
rate, and 𝑊𝑡  is the nominal wage rate. It is assumed that the government bond is paid 
according to the nominal interest rate of its previous period. 
The household’s problem is to choose the consumption level 𝐶𝑡 , labour supply 
𝐿𝑡 , capital stock for the next period 𝐾𝑡+1, the quantity of government bond for the 
next period 𝐵𝑡+1, and the stock shares of each intermediate firm 𝑆𝑡+1 𝑖 , in order to 
maximize his life time utility, subject to the budget constraint of each period, equation 
(1), given the price levels of the final good and stock shares, various tax rates, real 
capital rental rate and nominal bond interest rate. The first order conditions (FOCs) of 
the utility maximization problem are: 
 1− 𝜙 ∙ 𝐶𝑡
𝜙 ∙  1 − 𝐿𝑡 
=
 1 − 𝜏𝐿 ∙ 𝑊𝑡
 1 + 𝜏𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
                        (2) 
𝐸𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙  1 − 𝛿 +  1 − 𝜏𝐾 ∙ 𝑟𝑡+1
1   = 1                 (3) 
𝐸𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
∙  1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡
2  = 1                  (4) 
𝐸𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
∙
𝑄𝑡+1 𝑖 +  1− 𝜏𝐷 ∙ 𝐷𝑡+1 𝑖 
𝑄𝑡  𝑖 
 = 1           (5) 
 
3.1.2. Financial wealth and human wealth of households 
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We define the financial wealth Ω𝑡  and human wealth H𝑡  of the household as 
follows: 
Ω𝑡 ≜  1 − 𝛿 +  1− 𝜏𝐾 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 +  1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡−1
2  ∙ 𝐵𝑡
+  𝑆𝑡 𝑖 ∙ [𝑄𝑡  𝑖 + (1− 𝜏𝐷)
1
0
∙ 𝐷𝑡 𝑖 ]𝑑𝑖                      (6) 
H𝑡 ≜ 𝐸𝑡  𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ [ 1 − 𝜏𝐿 ∙ 𝑊𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝐿𝑡+𝑘 − 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡+𝑘 ]
∞
𝑘=0
              (7) 
where 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘  is the equilibrium discount factor of wealth and defined recursively by 
𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡 = 1, equation (8) and (9) as follows. The second part of equation (8) is derived 
from equation (4). 
𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ≜
1
1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡
2 = 𝐸𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
              (8) 
𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ≜ 𝐹𝑡+𝑖,𝑡+𝑖+1 =  
1
1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡+𝑖
2
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
            (9) 
The so-called no-ponzi game condition is given by the following equation: 
lim
𝑘→∞
𝐸𝑡  𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ Ω𝑡+𝑘 = 0                                (10) 
Combining equation (6) with equation (1), (3), (4) and (5) gives the following 
first-order difference equation of financial wealth Ω𝑡 : 
 1 + 𝜏𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 +𝐸𝑡  𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ∙ Ω𝑡+1 =  1− 𝜏𝐿 ∙ 𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡 + Ω𝑡      (11) 
Then combining equation (7), (9), (10) and (11) yields an equation in which the 
equilibrium nominal consumption is a fixed proportion of household’s total wealth 
(financial wealth plus human wealth), as below: 
𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 =
1
1 + 𝜏𝐶
∙  1 − 𝛽 ∙ (Ω𝑡 + H𝑡) 
So the stock price 𝑄𝑡  𝑖  may affect the household’s consumption and thus the whole 
economy through a wealth effect.  
 
3.2. Stochastic trends in the economy and unobserved components model 
 
3.2.1. Definition of trends and cycles and stochastic trends 
 
In this paper, as explained, both trends and cycles are taken into consideration when 
estimating the model and doing signal extraction, rather than using the normal but 
problematic methods, such as the HP filter. 
The trends of aggregate variables are defined when they are on the steady state 
balanced growth path of our DSGE model. Then the cyclical components (or cycles) 
of aggregate variables are defined as the gaps between their actual and trend levels.  
The steady state balanced growth path itself is assumed to be stochastic. In our model 
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there are two basic stochastic trends driving the stochastic steady state: the trend in 
the permanent technology which drives real output and the trend in the aggregate 
price level (for example, due to the increasing supply of fiat money). All other 
variables’ trends are composed of these two basic trends. These two basic trends are 
exogenously given. Therefore, the whole dynamic economic system in our model are 
divided into two uncorrelated parts: one is the stochastic steady state driven by these 
two underlying trends, and the other is the cyclical fluctuation around the steady state, 
which will be represented by the log-linearized version of our DSGE model. 
 
3.2.2. Stochastic trends and unobserved components model 
 
In the literature of unobserved components model (UCM) or structural time series 
model (STM), such as Harvey (1989) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993), stochastic trends 
and cycles can be directly modeled as unobserved components.  
For a seasonally-adjusted time series 𝑦𝑡 , the measurement equation can be given 
as follows:
3
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡  
The stochastic trend component 𝑦𝑡  can be normally assumed to follow a local linear 
trend model: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1      + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 
𝛾𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑡  
where 𝛾𝑡  can be viewed as, even though not strictly, the growth rate, and it is a 
random walk process; the disturbances, 𝜂𝑡  and 𝜁𝑡  are white noises, and serially 
uncorrelated.  
If the variance of the disturbance term 𝜁𝑡  is zero, the growth rate 𝛾𝑡  would be a 
constant, and then the above local linear trend model becomes a drifted random walk: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1      + 𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡  
where 𝛾 is then the average growth rate. An and Schorfheide (2007), Lafourcade and 
Wind (2012) and many others use such a drifted random walk to model the stochastic 
trend of permanent technology.  
Either local linear trend model or drifted random walk represents a growing trend. 
Then how to deal with the ―trend‖ which is neither upward growing nor stationary, 
such as the trend component of unemployment rate or inflation rate for some 
countries? The answer is to simply use a random walk. Take the time series of 
inflation rate Π𝑡  for instance: 
Π𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1 
Π𝑡 = Π𝑡   + Π𝑡  
Π𝑡   = Π𝑡−1      + 𝜂𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑡  is the aggregate price level, Π𝑡    is the trend inflation (sometimes called 
core inflation), and Π𝑡  is the cyclical component of inflation (or inflation gap). If we 
                                                           
3 In the UCM literature, usually another residual component is included in the measurement equation. But in this 
paper, we follow the convention of macroeconomics and do not distinguish between cyclical component and 
residual component, and the gap between actual time series and its trend is the cycle. For aggregate variables such 
as GDP, consumption, and so on, commonly take logarithm first; but for inflation rate or interest rate, do not take 
logarithm. 
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map the trend inflation to the trend price level, then in fact the above random walk 
model for trend inflation is equivalent to assuming an integrated random walk model, 
or smooth trend model, for the aggregate price level: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡      − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1        = Π𝑡    
Π𝑡   = Π𝑡−1      + 𝜂𝑡 
This is a special case of local linear trend model, in which the disturbance term of the 
trend is assumed to have zero variance. 
The HP filter method is a special kind of smooth trend model with the 
signal-noise ratio being a fixed number. Whether using a drifted random walk or the 
smooth trend model (or local linear trend model) to model stochastic trends depends 
on the integration property of the trends. If a trend is an I(1) process or its growth rate 
is stationary, a drifted random walk is a good choice; however, if the trend is an I(2) 
process or its growth rate is not stationary, then the smooth trend model or local linear 
trend model is a better alternative. Therefore, different from Lafourcade and Wind 
(2012) and many others who directly use a drifted random walk to model the 
stochastic trend of permanent technology without checking its integration property, 
we do the integration tests first for the two basic trends of our model: trends in the 
permanent technology and the aggregate price level, which could be reflected by the 
time series of real GDP and GDP deflator index according to the steady state analysis 
of our model in a later section. Since in this paper the UK economy will be taken as 
an example, the following figure depicts the growth rates of real GDP and GDP 
deflator for the UK. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Growth rates of real GDP and GDP deflator for the UK (annual data) 
 
Table 2. Unit root tests for growth rates of real GDP and GDP deflator 
Growth rate ADF statistic 1% and 5% critical values P value 
Real GDP -2.90 -3.68 and -2.97  0.06 
GDP deflator -2.30 -3.68 and -2.97 0.18 
Note: the null hypothesis is that the tested growth rate has a unit root. 
 
Either Figure 4 or Table 2 tells the same story: the growth rates of real GDP and 
GDP deflator of the UK are both non-stationary at the significance level of 5%. So in 
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this paper, both of the two basic trends (the trend in the permanent technology and the 
trend in the aggregate price level) are assumed to be an integrated random walk (a 
smooth trend)
4
 as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1      + 𝛾𝑡  
𝛾𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑡  
Note that for the growth rate of real GDP, it is stationary at the significance level of 
10%. So in a later part other alternative specifications for the stochastic trends will be 
examined, and it will prove the smooth trend specification here is best. 
 
3.2.3. Cycles and cyclical DSGE representation 
 
In the literature of UCM, the transition equation for the cycle is always exogenously 
given as follows: 
  
𝑦𝑡 
𝑦𝑡 
∗ = 𝜌  
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜆𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜆𝑦
−𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜆𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜆𝑦
  
𝑦𝑡−1 
𝑦𝑡−1 
∗ +  
𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
∗  
where 𝜆𝑦  is frequency in radians, 𝜌 is a damping factor with 0 < 𝜌 < 1 and 𝑘𝑡  
and 𝑘𝑡
∗
 
are two mutually independent white noise disturbances with zero means and 
common variance. The disturbances are serially and mutually uncorrelated. The 
reduced form for the cycle is, in fact, an ARMA(2,1) process in which the 
autoregressive part has complex roots. Different from the convention of UCM, the 
transition equation for the cycles in this paper will be endogenously given by a DSGE 
model.  
For the cyclical components of aggregate variables in DSGE models, 
log-linearization of a model around its steady state will give a vector difference 
equation (with expectation term) of the cyclical components, and its solution is (or 
can be numerically approximated as) a first-order vector autoregressive (VAR) process. 
This VAR(1) process is then the transition equation for cyclical components, which, 
combined with the transition equations for trend components and the measurement 
equation, will put the system into the traditional state space and Kalman-filter 
framework. 
 
3.3. Final good producer and price indices 
 
Final good producers first produce home good 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡  by combining a continuum of 
home-made intermediate goods 𝑌𝐻,𝑡(𝑖) , and foreign good 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡  by combining a 
continuum of imported foreign intermediate goods 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖); and then combine home 
good and foreign good to produce the final good 𝑌𝑡 , which can be used for 
households’ consumption, capital investment and government’s expenditure.  
The final good producers are perfectly competitive and there is zero profit for 
them. The technologies of producing home and foreign good, and then final good are 
all CES technologies as follows: 
                                                           
4 Here we employ the smooth trend model rather than the local linear trend model because this not only makes the 
trend smoother but also simplifies the estimation of the model. 
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𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
  
𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡
𝜉−1
𝜉 𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
𝜉
𝜉−1
  
 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
  
𝑌𝑡 =   1− 𝜌 
1
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝜔−1
𝜔 + 𝜌
1
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡
𝜔−1
𝜔  
𝜔
𝜔−1
    
where 𝑖 represents the brand of intermediate goods, 𝑗 is the country index, 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡  is 
the foreign goods bundle from country 𝑗, 𝜀 denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between the differentiated intermediate goods within one single country, 𝜉 measures 
the substitutability between goods produced in different foreign countries, 𝜔(> 0) 
represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and 𝜌 
refers to the share of domestic aggregate demand allocated to imported goods and is 
thus a natural index of openness of the small open economy in our model. 
Then given the price levels of goods, the cost minimization problem of the 
representative final good producer yields the following demand functions: 
𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝐻,𝑡                        (12) 
𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡                         (13) 
𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
 
−𝜉
∙ 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡                             (14) 
𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∙  
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡                    (15) 
𝑌𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜌 ∙  
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡                        (16) 
where 𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖), 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖), 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡, 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 , 𝑃𝐹,𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑡  are respectively the price levels of 
home-made intermediate good 𝑖, imported intermediate good 𝑖 from country 𝑗 , 
imported goods bundle from country 𝑗, home good, foreign good and final good, all 
denominated in domestic currency. So in fact 𝑃𝐻,𝑡  is the GDP deflator. Since the final 
good producers are perfectly competitive and there is no profit for them, we can easily 
derive the following price index formulas: 
𝑃𝐻,𝑡 =   𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                    (17) 
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𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡 =   𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                     (18) 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 =   𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
1−𝜉𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
1
1−𝜉
                       (19) 
𝑃𝑡 =   1− 𝜌 ∙ 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
(1−𝜔) + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
(1−𝜔) 
1
1−𝜔               (20) 
Now we give some definitions and derive some identities which link the price 
levels, exchange rates and terms of trade. For simplicity and tractability, we assume 
symmetric steady state for all the countries in our model, which means in the steady 
state many variables of the home country and foreign countries share the same 
properties, and some of them have the same values or dynamics.  
The effective terms of trade (TOT) is defined by: 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 ≜
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
=   𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡
1−𝜉𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
1
1−𝜉
                   (21) 
where 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡/𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡  is the terms of trade for country 𝑗, and the second part of 
the above equation is derived from equation (18). Equation (21) can be approximated 
around the symmetric steady state when 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡 = 1 for all 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] by: 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 ) ≈  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑗 ,𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
            
where 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑗 ,𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡). Hereafter, for a variable denoted by a capital letter, say 𝑋𝑡 , 
the corresponding small letter 𝑥𝑡 is defined as its logarithm: 𝑥𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡 . 
Similarly, log-linearization of equation (20) around the symmetric steady state 
when 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 , together with the definition of the effective terms of 
trade, equation (21), will result in the following equations: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡+𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡                                (22) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐹,𝑡− 1− 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡                              (23) 
Given the definition of inflation rate (Π𝑡 ≜△ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 ), equation (22) gives: 
Π𝑡 = Π𝐻,𝑡+𝜌 ∙△ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡    
where △ is the difference operator.  
The law of one price (LOOP) is assumed to hold, so: 
𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡 𝑖 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗  𝑖 , for ∀ j, i ∈ [0,1] 
where 𝐸𝑡
𝑗
 is the exchange rate, price of country 𝑗 ’s currency denominated in 
domestic currency; and 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗  𝑖  is the price of intermediate good 𝑖 imported from 
country 𝑗, denominated in country 𝑗’s currency. Combining this LOOP condition 
with equation (18) leads to: 
𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗 ,𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗 =   𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗  𝑖 1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
 
Log-linearization of equation (19) around the symmetric steady state when 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡 =
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 , together with the above equation, will give the result below: 
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𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐹,𝑡 =  (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗 )𝑑𝑗
1
0
= 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗  
where 𝑒𝑡 ≜  (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡
𝑗 )𝑑𝑗
1
0
 is the log aggregate exchange rate, and 𝑝𝑡
∗ =  (𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗 )𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
is the log world price index.
5
 Equation (23) and the above equation can yield: 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 =
1
1 − 𝜌
∙ (𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 )                            
If the aggregate exchange rate and world price level are defined as 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ≜ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑡), 
and  𝑃𝑡
∗ ≜ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑝𝑡
∗), then the equation above gives the relationship between the real 
exchange rate, 𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
∗/𝑃𝑡 , and terms of trade, 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 : 
𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑡) = (1 − 𝜌) ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡        
This equation tells us that: although the LOOP holds for each individual intermediate 
good, the purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold; and the real exchange rate 
may fluctuate over time as a result of variations in the relative price of home and 
foreign good. 
 
3.4. Intermediate-goods firms and price setting 
 
Intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Firm 𝑖  produces a 
differentiated intermediate good 𝑖 with a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑖) = 𝜖𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝛼 ∙  𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡(𝑖) 
𝛼                         (24) 
where total factor productivity is decomposed into a temporary shock 𝜖𝑡  and a 
permanent stochastic trend 𝐴𝑡 , whose stochastic processes are respectively: 
𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑎 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑎 ,𝑣𝑡
𝑎~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑎
2)                   
and  
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡
𝐴 
𝛾𝑡
𝐴 = 𝛾𝑡−1
𝐴 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴,𝜂𝑡
𝐴~𝑁(0,𝜎𝐴
2)              
When the economy reaches its stochastic steady state, the temporary shock is equal to 
its mean value one, and the total factor productivity is (𝐴𝑡)
𝛼 .  
Then FOCs of the cost minimization problem are given by: 
𝑟𝑡
1 = (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝜖𝑡 ∙  
𝐾𝑡(𝑖)
𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡(𝑖)
 
−𝛼
∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖)                     (25) 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 𝛼 ∙ 𝜖𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑡 ∙  
𝐾𝑡(𝑖)
𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡(𝑖)
 
1−𝛼
∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖)   
where 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖) is the real marginal cost. The above two equations can imply: 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
1 =
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
∙
𝐾𝑡(𝑖)
𝐿𝑡(𝑖)
                              (26) 
Then combining the above equation and equation (25), we can get: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 𝑖 =
1
𝜖𝑡
∙
(1 − 𝛼)𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼
∙  
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑡
 
𝛼
∙ (𝑟𝑡
1)1−𝛼 ≡ 𝑚𝑐𝑡                 (27) 
Following the staggered price setting of Calvo (1983), we assume each 
                                                           
5 Here domestic price does not affect the world price index, since we assume each country is of zero measure. 
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intermediate-goods firm may re-optimize its nominal price only with probability 
1 − 𝜃 in any given period. With probability 𝜃, instead, the firm automatically and 
costlessly adjusts its price according to an indexation rule. There are two types of 
indexation rules usually employed in the literature: to steady state inflation, such as 
Yun (1996); and to past inflation rates, such as Christiano et al. (2005).
6
 For 
simplicity, the steady-state-inflation indexation rule is adopted. Combining the fact 
that all firms resetting prices will choose an identical price 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆  and the equation (17), 
we can get: 
𝑃𝐻,𝑡 =  𝜃 ∙  (1 + Π ) ∙ 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1 
1−𝜀
+ (1 − 𝜃) ∙ 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 1−𝜀  
1
1−𝜀
             (28) 
At the deterministic steady state, 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1 = 1 + Π , where Π  is 
the deterministic steady-state inflation. So at the steady state 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 . 
The price-resetting firm sets price 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆  to maximize the current market value of 
the profits generated while that price remains effective, which means it solves the 
following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆
 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙  𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ∙ (1 + Π )𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 − Φ𝑡+𝑘(𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡)           (29) 
subject to the sequence of demand constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ∙ (1 + Π )𝑘
𝑃𝐻,𝑡+𝑘
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑑                      (30) 
where 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘  is the discount factor for nominal payoffs, Φ𝑡+𝑘  is the nominal cost 
function, 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡  denotes output in period 𝑡 + 𝑘 for a firm that last freely reset its 
price in period 𝑡, and 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑑  is the total demand (including domestic and foreign) for 
domestic goods. FOC of the above problem is given by: 
 𝜃𝑘 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 ∙  𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ∙ (1 + Π )𝑘 − 𝜿 ∙ Φ𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′   
∞
𝑘=0
= 0           (31) 
where Φ𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′ = Φ𝑡+𝑘
′ (𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡) is the nominal marginal cost in period 𝑡 + 𝑘 for a firm 
that last reset its price in period 𝑡 and Φ𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′ = 𝑃𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 , and 𝜿 = 𝜀/(𝜀 − 1) 
which can be interpreted as the desired or frictionless markup.  
We guess (and will prove later on) that in the deterministic steady state, 
consumption and output grow at the same rate as the average growth rate of 
permanent technology, 𝛾𝐴. And in deterministic the steady state, price levels grow at 
the rate of Π . So given equation (8) and (9), a first-order Taylor expansion of 
equation (31) around the constant inflation steady state yields: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡−1 = (1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃) ∙ (𝛽 ∙ 𝜃)
𝑘 ∙ 𝐸𝑡
∞
𝑘=0
 
𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡+𝑘
−𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1 − 𝜿 ∙ Π 
       (32) 
where 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑐) is the log deviation of real marginal cost 
                                                           
6 Ascari et al. (2010) estimate and compare New-Keynesian DSGE monetary models of the business cycle derived 
under two different pricing schemes – Calvo and Rotemberg – under a positive trend inflation rate. Their empirical 
findings provide evidence in favor of the statistical superiority of the Calvo setting. That is one reason why in our 
model we choose the Calvo pricing scheme. 
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from its steady state value 𝑚𝑐, and 𝑚𝑐 = 1/𝜿 = (𝜀 − 1)/𝜀.  
Equation (27) says that the real marginal cost is independent of the level of 
production, and hence 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘  in equation (32), which can then imply that: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡+1
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡  
+ 1− 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡 + Π𝐻,𝑡 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙ Π   
The above equation, together with equation (28) and (22), will give the following 
open-economy New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC): 
   Π𝐻,𝑡 =  1 − 𝛽 ∙ Π + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 Π𝐻,𝑡+1 +
 1 − 𝜃 ∙  1− 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 
𝜃
∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡     (33) 
When the steady-state inflation rate is higher (probably driven by higher growth of 
money supply), or the expectation of future home-good price inflation increases, the 
home-good inflation in the current period will increase as well. When real marginal 
cost is higher than its steady state value, home-good inflation is going to increase. 
When the foreign-good price inflation increases, the terms of trade will increase and 
thus lead to a higher home-good inflation (the so called ―imported inflation‖). The 
greater the degree of the economy openness ( 𝜌 ) is, the bigger this kind of 
imported-inflation effect will be. In Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Funke et al. 
(2010), the terms of trade do not appear in their open economy NKPC, because in 
their models nominal marginal cost is calculated as the real marginal cost times home 
good price level, rather than final good price level used in our model. This is not 
reasonable, since it is an open economy and the households consume final good that is 
synthesized by both home good and foreign good. So the nominal wage rate should 
correspond to the final good price level, rather than only the home good price. The 
foreign good price can affect the home good inflation through nominal marginal cost 
(such as nominal wage rate for workers). Finally, the sticker the price setting is 
(higher 𝜃), the smaller the effects of real marginal cost and terms of trade on 
home-good price inflation are. This is because the price adjustment of firms is now 
more inertial and less sensitive to the changes of market environment. 
 
3.5. Government, taxation, and fiscal and monetary policies 
 
For the government of our small open economy, fiscal revenue consists of six 
components: labour income tax with rate 𝜏𝐿 , capital rental income tax with rate 𝜏𝐾 , 
consumption tax with rate 𝜏𝐶 , bond interest income tax with rate 𝜏𝐵 , share dividend 
tax with rate 𝜏𝐷 , and nominal lump-sum tax 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡 . Therefore, the nominal aggregate 
fiscal revenue 𝐹𝑅𝑡 is equal to:  
 𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝜏𝐿 ∙ 𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜏𝐾 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡−1
2 ∙ 𝐵𝑡  
+𝜏𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡 𝑖 ∙ 𝜏𝐷
1
0
∙ 𝐷𝑡 𝑖 𝑑𝑖 + 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡  
Government debt 𝐵𝑡  evolves according to: 
𝐵𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
2 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐹𝐵𝑡      
where 𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡  denotes fiscal balances (surplus), and 𝐺𝑡  is the nominal 
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government expenditure. We define the debt-GDP ratio 𝑏𝑡  and government 
expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡  as follows: 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡/(𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 )                         (34) 
𝑔𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡/(𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 )                        (35) 
We assume that government expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡  follows an 𝐴𝑅(1) process:
7
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑡) =  1 − 𝜌𝐺 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑔) + 𝜌𝐺 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑡
𝐺 ,𝑣𝑡
𝐺~𝑁(0,𝜎𝐺
2)          (36) 
We also assume the lump-sum tax rule of the government is to react to deviations 
from the target debt-GDP ratio 𝑏 with a lag. Define the lump-sum tax-GDP ratio 
𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑡  as: 
𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡/(𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) 
Then the lump-sum tax rule has the following format: 
𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑠𝑡
=  
𝑏𝑡−1
𝑏
 
𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇
                            (37) 
where 𝑙𝑠𝑡 is the steady-state level of lump-sum tax-GDP ratio, and 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇  is the 
elasticity.  
In terms of monetary policy, we assume a Taylor type empirical monetary policy 
rule for nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡
2 as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
2 =  1− 𝜌𝑅 ∙  𝑅 + 𝜑1 ∙  Π𝑡 −Π  + 𝜑2 ∙ GAP𝑡  
+𝜌𝑅 ∙ 𝑅𝑡−1
2 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑅 ,𝑣𝑡
𝑅~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑅
2)          
where 𝑅  is the steady-state level of nominal interest rate, Π  is the deterministic 
steady-state inflation rate and is also assumed to be the target inflation rate of the 
monetary authority, and GAP𝑡 is the real GDP gap. 
 
3.6. Equilibrium  
 
3.6.1. Resources constraints and aggregate demand 
 
For labour market and capital market, we have the following market clearing 
conditions: 
𝐿𝑡 =  𝐿𝑡 𝑖 
1
0
𝑑𝑖                          (38) 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝐾𝑡+1 𝑖 
1
0
𝑑𝑖 =  1 − 𝛿 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡                (39) 
We define the real GDP in the way below: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ≜   𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
        
So given the budget constraint 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 =  𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖) ∙ 𝑌𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
, the demand of the 
                                                           
7 Here we actually assume in the steady state government expenditure is a fixed proportion of GDP. This is to 
make our model solvable, but not meaning that we care about the ―trend‖ of real government expenditure. As we 
explained previously, real government expenditure is discretionary in reality and fiscal economists usually do not 
consider its cyclical property. This is why in this paper when we calculate structural fiscal balances; we only adjust 
nominal government expenditure one-to-one to the cycle of aggregate price level, but ignore the cyclicality of real 
government expenditure.  
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intermediate good 𝑖 is given by: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡                         (40) 
Integrating the above equation over all the intermediate-goods firms, given equation 
(38), (39), (24) and (26), will yield the following aggregate production function: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡
1−𝛼 ∙  𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 
𝛼                     (41) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡  is the price dispersion defined as follows, and it is greater than or equal 
to one. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡 =   
𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
 
−𝜀
𝑑𝑖
1
0
                        (42) 
For the final good demand 𝑌𝑡 , we have the following identity: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡/𝑃𝑡     
The market clearing condition for each intermediate good is : 
𝑌𝑡 𝑖 = 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 𝑖 +  𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑗 (𝑖)𝑑𝑗
1
0
                     
where 𝑌𝐻,𝑡
𝑗 (𝑖) is the demand of home-made intermediate good 𝑖 from country 𝑗. 
According to equations (12)-(16) and their counterparts for each foreign country 𝑗, 
the above equation is equivalent to the following: 
𝑌𝑡  𝑖 =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙
 
 
 
 
  1− 𝜌 ∙  
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡 +
𝜌 ∙   
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸𝑡
𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑗
 
−𝜉
∙  
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑗
𝑃𝑡
𝑗
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗
1
0  
 
 
 
 
          
where 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑃𝑡
𝑗
 and 𝑌𝑡
𝑗
 are respectively foreign good price, aggregate price, and 
aggregate demand of country 𝑗.  
Plugging the equation above into equation (40), we can obtain: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 =    
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙   1 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙   𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡 
𝜉−𝜔
∙  𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑗  
𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗
1
0
  
where 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗 ,𝑡/𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡  represents the bilateral terms of trade between the home 
country and foreign country 𝑗, and 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑗
 is the effective terms of trade of country 𝑗.  
First order log-linear approximation of the equation above around the symmetric 
steady state when 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗 ,𝑡 = 1 and 𝑌𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑌𝑡  can lead to the following: 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 =  1− 𝜌 ∙ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑦𝑡
∗ + 𝜌 ∙  𝜉 + 𝜔 ∙  1 − 𝜌  ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡             (43) 
where 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) , 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) , and 𝑦𝑡
∗ =  𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡
𝑗 )𝑑𝑗
1
0
 is the log world 
aggregate demand.  
Since symmetry is assumed in our model, a condition analogous to equation (43) 
will hold for all countries. So we can derive a world market clearing condition as 
below:  
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
∗ ≜  𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗
1
0
=   1 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑦𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗
1
0
+ 𝜌 ∙ 𝑦𝑡
∗ 
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+𝜌 ∙  𝜉 + 𝜔 ∙  1 − 𝜌  ∙  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗 = 𝑦𝑡
∗1
0
   (44)  
where  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑑𝑗
1
0
= 0 can be easily proved. Equation (44) tells an intuitive result: for 
the world as a whole, aggregate product (supply) equals aggregate demand. 
Substituting equation (44) into equation (43), we can obtain: 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 =  1− 𝜌 ∙ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝜌 ∙  𝜉 + 𝜔 ∙  1 − 𝜌  ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  
 
3.6.2. Stock market 
 
Euler equation (5) of the stock market can give the equation below: 
𝑄𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ∙  𝑄𝑡+1 𝑖 + (1 − 𝜏𝐷) ∙ 𝐷𝑡+1(𝑖)   
We define the aggregate dividend and aggregate stock price as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 𝐷𝑡 ≜  𝐷𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
𝑄𝑡 ≜  𝑄𝑡 (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
     
Then we can get the following aggregate relationship: 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ∙  𝑄𝑡+1 +  1 − 𝜏𝐷 ∙ 𝐷𝑡+1  =  (1− 𝜏𝐷)
∞
𝑘=1 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝐷𝑡+𝑘  (45) 
This result is intuitive, saying that the aggregate stock price is equal to the present 
value of all the future after-tax aggregate dividends. Since the dividend comes from 
the monopolistic profit of intermediate-goods firms, we can get: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝐾𝑡                               (46) 
 
3.6.3. Aggregate supply: marginal cost and NKPC 
 
Combining equation (25) with equation (26) and (24) will lead to: 
𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 𝑖 +
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
∙ 𝐿𝑡 𝑖 = 𝑌𝑡 𝑖 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡  
Given equation (40) and (42), integrating the equation above over intermediate-goods 
firms will give the following aggregate equation: 
𝑟𝑡
1 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 +
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
∙ 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡                          (47) 
Combining the equation above with the equation for aggregate dividend, equation 
(46), we can get: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ∙  𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡                           (48) 
Log-linearization of equation (48) around the steady state gives the following: 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑡 = 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 −  𝜀 − 1 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑐𝑡) + 𝛼5              (49) 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡) = 0 because 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑡  is of second order and is equal to zero up to a 
first order approximation (see Galí and Monacelli, 2005; and others) . 
As said previously, it is assumed there is a stochastic trend in the aggregate price 
level 𝑃𝑡 . Now assume the measurement equation and transition equation of the 
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aggregate price level 𝑃𝑡  take the following form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑡  
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡
𝑃 
𝛾𝑡
𝑃 = 𝛾𝑡−1
𝑃 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑃, 𝜂𝑡
𝑃~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑃
2) 
where 𝑀𝑡  is the stochastic trend of the aggregate price level, and 𝑁𝑡  is the cycle. 
Equation (49), written in a cycle form, can lead to:  
𝐷𝑡 = GAP𝑡 + 𝜀 ∙ 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 −  𝜀 − 1 ∙ (𝑃𝑡 + 𝑚𝑐𝑡 ) 
where variables with hat denote the corresponding cyclical components: percentage 
deviation from variables’ steady state levels, and GAP𝑡  is the real GDP gap. 
Combining the equation above with equation (33) and (22), given the fact that 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 , we can get the following NKPC: 
   Π𝐻 ,𝑡 =  1 − 𝛽 ∙ Π + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 Π𝐻 ,𝑡+1  
+
 1 − 𝜃 ∙  1− 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 
𝜃 ∙  𝜀 − 1 
∙  GAP𝑡 −𝐷𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡        
Therefore, the GDP deflator inflation Π𝐻,𝑡  depends on trend inflation, inflation 
expectation, GDP gap, stock dividend (monopolistic profit) gap, terms of trade, and 
the aggregate price cycle.  
 
3.7. Trend-cycle decomposition of the model: a state-space representation 
 
Log-linearization of our model around its deterministic steady-state balanced growth 
path will lead to a set of equations linking the variables’ cyclical components. Here 
when one variable is bond interest rate, capital rental rate, or inflation rate, its cyclical 
component means the difference between its level and its steady state value. 
Otherwise, cyclical component of one variable denotes the percentage deviation from 
its steady state value. All the cyclical components of the relevant variables are 
denoted by hat, except that the terms of trade cycle and the output gap are denoted by 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  and GAP𝑡 respectively. 
In Appendix A, 24 log-linearized equations linking all the aggregate variables of 
interest are provided. As a whole, this linear cyclical DSGE system can be written in 
the following form: 
𝐸𝑡 ℱΘ 𝑋𝑡+1 ,𝑋𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡−1 ,Ξ𝑡  = 0 
where 𝑋𝑡  is a vector of all the endogenous variables in the system, 𝑋𝑡  is its 
corresponding cyclical component vector, Ξ𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, Σ)  is a random vector of 
structural shocks, and ℱΘ  is a real function parameterized by a real vector Θ 
gathering the deep parameters of the model. The whole system is stochastic, forward 
looking and linear.  
When a unique, stable and invariant solution of the system exists, it can be given 
by a stochastic vector difference equation: 
𝑋𝑡 = ℋΘ 𝑋𝑡−1 ,Ξ𝑡                                      (50) 
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Then the endogenous variables are written as a function of their lags and the 
contemporaneous structural shocks. ℋΘ  collects the corresponding policy rules and 
transition functions. Generally, it is not possible to get a closed form solution, and 
usually an approximation of the true solution (50) is considered. A local 
approximation of equation (50) around the steady state when 𝑋𝑡 = 0 can be used, 
and then solution (50) is approximately linear.  
Suppose 𝑋𝑡
𝑂 is the vector of observable variables, and then the trend-cycle 
decomposition of the data should take the following form: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑋𝑡
𝑂    + 𝑋𝑡
𝑂  
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑂     is the vector of trend components, and in this paper it is a vector integrated 
random walk as follows: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑂    = 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑂      + Γ𝑡  
Γ𝑡 = Γ𝑡−1 + Λ𝑡  
And 𝑋𝑡
𝑂  is the vector of the observables’ cyclical components, and it is a linear 
function of 𝑋𝑡 : 
𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = Ζ ∙ 𝑋𝑡  
Therefore, we can put the whole model together with the observable variables 
into a state space representation as below: 
 
 
 
 
 𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑋𝑡
𝑂    + 𝑋𝑡
𝑂 
𝑋𝑡
𝑂    = 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑂      + Γ𝑡
Γ𝑡 = Γ𝑡−1 + Λ𝑡
𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = Ζ ∙ 𝑋𝑡 
𝑋𝑡 = ℋΘ 𝑋𝑡−1 ,Ξ𝑡 
  
Since there are unit root processes (integrated random walks), from the 
computational point of view we need to take second-order difference to put the above 
state space form into a stationary representation as below: 
 
∆2𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑋𝑡
𝑂 − 2𝑋𝑡−1
𝑂 + 𝑋𝑡−2
𝑂 + Λ𝑡
𝑋𝑡
𝑂 = Ζ ∙ 𝑋𝑡 
𝑋𝑡 = ℋΘ 𝑋𝑡−1 ,Ξ𝑡 
                    (51) 
 
3.8. Steady state 
 
It is necessary to solve and analyze the steady state of our model for two reasons. First 
of all, the steady state is one of the key elements of DSGE paradigm, and in our 
framework the steady state corresponds to the trend of the whole economy. The steady 
state balanced growth property determines the co-integration relationships among the 
trend components in the above state space model. Secondly, some parameters of the 
log-linearized equation system linking the cyclical components of aggregate variables 
in the above section depend on the steady state property of the model. 
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We first solve for the steady state balance growth path when the steady state is 
deterministic, i.e. 𝜂𝑡
𝐴 ≡ 0, and 𝜂𝑡
𝑀 ≡ 0. Thus, all the growth rates on the steady state 
balanced growth path are the functions of the following two basic constant growth 
rates: 
 
𝐵𝐺𝐴 = 𝛾𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑀 = Π 
                    
Henceforth, we use 𝐵𝐺𝑥  to denote the growth rate of variable 𝑥 at the steady state.  
The ―guess and verify‖ method is employed to obtain steady state growth rates 
for aggregate variables. Equations (26), (27), (34), (35), (41), (2), and (48) & (45) can 
respectively lead to the following relationships among growth rates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝐺𝑊 − 𝐵𝐺𝑀 − 𝐵𝐺𝑟𝑡1 = 𝐵𝐺𝐾 − 𝐵𝐺𝐿
𝐵𝐺𝑚𝑐 = 𝛼 ∙  𝐵𝐺𝑊 − 𝐵𝐺𝑀 − 𝐵𝐺𝐴 + (1− 𝛼) ∙ 𝐵𝐺𝑟𝑡1
𝐵𝐺𝐵 = 𝐵𝐺𝑀 + 𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐵𝐺𝐺 = 𝐵𝐺𝑀 + 𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝛼 ∙  𝐵𝐺𝐴 + 𝐵𝐺𝐿 + (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝐵𝐺𝐾
𝐵𝐺𝐶 = 𝐵𝐺𝑊 − 𝐵𝐺𝑀
𝐵𝐺𝐷 = 𝐵𝐺𝑄 = 𝐵𝐺𝑃 + 𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃
  
Since at the steady state, 𝑚𝑐 = (𝜀 − 1)/𝜀, we can get 𝐵𝐺𝑚𝑐 = 0. Equation (3) 
and (4) can yield the following: 
 
 
 𝑅𝑡
2 =
1
1 − 𝜏𝐵
∙ (𝐵𝐺𝐶 − 𝑙𝑛𝛽 + 𝐵𝐺𝑀)
𝑟𝑡
1 =
1
1 − 𝜏𝐾
∙ (𝐵𝐺𝐶 − 𝑙𝑛𝛽 + 𝛿)
                   
Therefore, 𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡2 = 0, and 𝐵𝐺𝑟𝑡1 = 0 as well. 
Since there is no population growth in our model, it is reasonable to guess that 
𝐵𝐺𝐿 = 0. And we also guess: 
 
𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐵𝐺𝐶 = 𝐵𝐺𝐼 = 𝐵𝐺𝐾 = 𝐵𝐺𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑊 = 𝐵𝐺𝐴 + 𝐵𝐺𝑀
𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑅 = 𝐵𝐺𝐴 + 𝐵𝐺𝑀
𝐵𝐺𝐵 = 𝐵𝐺𝐺 = 𝐵𝐺𝐴 + 𝐵𝐺𝑀
                                       (52) 
It is easy to verify that: given the above guess, the whole system is self-consistent at 
the steady state.  
In the above log-linearized DSGE system linking the cyclical components, there 
are some unknown parameters which are determined by the steady state balanced 
growth path. To be specific, four ratios need to be pinned down: 
 
 
 
 
 𝑅𝑇𝐷 ≜ 𝐷𝑡
   /(𝑃𝐻,𝑡     ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡       )
𝑅𝑇𝑄 ≜ 𝑄𝑡   /(𝑃𝐻,𝑡     ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡       )
𝑅𝑇𝐾 ≜ 𝐾𝑡   /𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡       
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑅 ≜ 𝐹𝑅𝑡     /(𝑃𝐻,𝑡     ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡       )
   
The ratio 𝑅𝑇𝐷  can be given by equation (48): 𝑅𝑇𝐷 = 1/ 𝜀, if 𝜀 is known. The 
ratio 𝑅𝑇𝑄  can be computed by 𝑅𝑇𝐷  and the steady-state price-earnings ratio of the 
stock market, 𝑄𝑡   /𝐷𝑡   . 𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑅  can be given by the average nominal fiscal revenue-GDP 
ratio of the data. And finally 𝑅𝑇𝐾  and the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate goods within one single country 𝜀, given the capital depreciation rate 𝛿, 
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can be derived by equation (47) and (39) as follows: 
𝑅𝑇𝐾 =
𝜀 − 1
𝜀 ∙ (𝛾𝐴 − 𝑙𝑛𝛽 + 𝛿)
∙  1 − 𝛼 ∙ (1− 𝜏𝐾)             (53) 
and  
𝜀 = 1 +
1
1−
 𝛿 + 𝛾𝐴 ∙  1− 𝛼 ∙  1 − 𝜏𝐾 
𝑅𝑇𝐼 ∙  𝛿 + 𝛾𝐴 − 𝑙𝑛𝛽 
                      (54) 
where 𝑅𝑇𝐼  denotes the investment-GDP ratio in the steady state, which can be given 
by the average investment-GDP ratio of the data. Note that in this paper the elasticity 
of substitution between intermediate goods is endogenously, rather than exogenously 
determined. 
Now we come to the stochastic steady state when the two basic exogenous 
growth rates are random walks and given by: 
 
𝐵𝐺𝐴 = 𝛾𝑡
𝐴 = 𝛾𝑡−1
𝐴 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑀 = 𝛾𝑡
𝑃 = 𝛾𝑡−1
𝑃 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑃
                      (55) 
As in the literature, for simplicity we assume that the balanced growth property in the 
deterministic steady state situation is maintained in the setting of stochastic steady 
state. For example, in the stochastic steady state: GDP, consumption and investment 
will all grow at the rate 𝐵𝐺𝐴; nominal aggregate fiscal revenue and government 
expenditure will both grow at the rate 𝐵𝐺𝐴 + 𝐵𝐺𝑀 .  
 
4. BAYESIAN ESTIMATION AND SIGNAL EXTRACTION 
 
4.1. UK as an example 
 
We take the UK as an example of the small open economy in our model. Six 
macroeconomic time series are considered: real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ), GDP deflator (𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡), 
nominal primary fiscal revenue (𝐹𝑅𝑡), nominal primary government expenditure (𝐺𝑡), 
stock price index (𝑄𝑡), and terms of trade index (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡). Here terms of trade index is 
normalized to make its mean equal to one. The data, from IMF WEO database, is 
annual data and the sample period is from 1981 to 2011. It is worth pointing out that 
we do not use the data for real consumption, real investment and nominal government 
bond even though they are available, because for the Bayesian estimation 
implemented in this paper the number of observable variables must be smaller than or 
equal to the number of exogenous shocks. As shown by equation (51), all the six time 
series except terms of trade should be transformed into their second-order difference 
before the estimation. We plot the data in Appendix C1. 
Some unknown parameters of our open economy DSGE model will be estimated 
by Bayesian method, conditional on prior information concerning the values of 
parameters. We abandon the standard but problematic practice which at the very 
beginning removes trend components from the observed macroeconomic variables 
simply using such as the HP filter. Instead, we do the model estimation and signal 
extraction of trend-cycle decomposition simultaneously. Advances have been made 
during recent years in estimating DSGE models, shifting emphasis in quantitative 
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macroeconomics from calibration exercises to directly estimating the parameters of a 
structural model and letting the data speak. The so called Bayesian technique, as 
strongly claimed by An and Schorfheide (2007) and others, is currently the standard 
tool to estimate DSGE models. Just as shown in this paper, linear approximation of a 
DSGE model can lead to a state space representation that could be analyzed using the 
Kalman filter. Given the specification of prior distributions for the parameters and the 
likelihood based on the data, the state space representation can then yield the 
parameter’s posterior distribution. Bayesian estimation is to maximize the likelihood 
of the posterior distributions. Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
algorithm is employed to numerically obtain a sequence from the unknown posterior 
distributions. Once we get the posterior distributions of parameters, we use their 
posterior means to pin down the whole model. After that, we can do the impulse 
response analysis and variance decomposition as well, especially for the variable that 
we are mostly interested: nominal fiscal revenue 𝐹𝑅𝑡. Then we can also do the signal 
extraction, using the Kalman smoother, to get a time series for the cyclical component 
of nominal fiscal revenue, 𝐹𝑅𝑡 , which is an unobserved endogenous variable in the 
state space representation of our framework. Therefore, the trend component of the 
nominal fiscal revenue can be obtained. Finally we can calculate the structural fiscal 
balances.  
Bayesian estimation is in fact the middle-of-the-road line between the traditional 
calibration procedure and econometrically maximum likelihood estimation. On one 
hand, it lets data speak and can fully utilize the information in the data. On the other 
hand, reasonable prior distributions guarantee that the estimation result does not 
deviate too much away from macroeconomics theories.  
 
4.2. Calibration  
 
There are some parameters that remain fixed during the estimation procedure, and 
need to be calibrated. This kind of parameters fall into two categories: one includes 
those parameters that are difficult to estimate, such as substitution elasticities between 
home and foreign goods and Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply; the other 
category is a collection of parameters that are better identified using other information. 
To account for these calibrated parameters’ influence on the estimation results, 
robustness checks will be executed at last, by using alternative values for these 
parameters. We first present the baseline calibration of these fixed parameters as 
follows. 
Table 3 lists the baseline calibrated values for some parameters. The production 
function parameter 𝛼 is set to 0.69, consistent with Faccini et al. (2011), Bhattarai 
and Trzeciakiewicz (2012), and many other studies on the UK economy. Nevertheless, 
Dicecio and Nelson (2007) use a value of 0.64. We will do a robustness check for this 
aspect later on. The annual utility discount factor 𝛽 is set to be 0.96, indicating that 
the quarterly discount factor is equal to 0.99. This follows Dicecio and Nelson (2007), 
Moons (2009), Faccini et al. (2011), and Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012). The 
weight of consumption in the utility, 𝜙, is set to be 0.50, following Paetz (2011). Two 
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parameters in the Taylor rule, 𝜑1  and 𝜑2, are set to be 1.5 and 0.25 respectively. The 
former is based on the suggestion of Moons (2009) and Faccini et al. (2011), even 
thought Dicecio and Nelson (2007) employ a relatively smaller value, 1.28. The latter 
is the average number of those in Dicecio and Nelson (2007), and Moons (2009), 
since there is no commonly used setting.  
 
Table 3. Baseline calibration 
Parameter Calibrated value Based on 
𝛼 0.69 Faccini et al. (2011), Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) 
𝛽 0.96 Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012), Faccini et al. (2011), 
Moons (2009), and Dicecio and Nelson (2007) 
𝜙 0.50 Paetz (2011) 
𝜑1 1.50 Moons (2009), Faccini et al. (2011) 
𝜑2  0.25 Average of Dicecio and Nelson (2007) and Moons (2009) 
𝛿 0.10 Faccini et al. (2011), where quarterly rate equals 0.025 
𝜉 1.5 Collard and Dellas (2002) suggest a value between 1 and 2 
𝜔 6.0 Micro data suggest 5-10; Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 0.0005 Lafourcade and Wind (2012) 
𝜏𝐶 0.169 Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), consumption tax rate 
𝜏𝐾  0.384 Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), capital income tax rate 
𝜏𝐿 0.210 Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), labour income tax rate 
𝜏𝐵 0.15 UK tax rates on savings income of the year 2012-2013 
𝜏𝐷  0.15 UK dividend tax rates of the year 2012-2013 
 
Now we look at several elasticities in our model: elasticity of substitution 
between intermediate goods within one single country 𝜀, elasticity of substitution 
between goods from different foreign countries 𝜉, elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods 𝜔, and lump-sum tax feedback elasticity for government 
debt 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 .  
In Funke et al. (2010) and many other New Keynesian DSGE models, 𝜀 is often 
calibrated to be 11, leading to a 10% steady-state markup over marginal cost. But in 
this paper, we make 𝜀 endogenously determined by other parameters, especially by 
the physical capital depreciation rate 𝛿. Because, otherwise (if we set 𝜀 to be 11), 
according to equation (54) the capital depreciation rate can be a very unreasonable 
value, and the same happens for some other parameters whose values depend on 𝛿. 
Therefore, first we set 𝛿 to be 0.10, consistent with Faccini et al. (2011), in which 
the quarterly rate of capital depreciation is equal to 0.025. Then equation (54) yields a 
value of 17.76 for 𝜀, which means a 6%, rather than 10%, steady-state markup over 
marginal cost. For 𝜉, Collard and Dellas (2002) suggest a value between one and two, 
so we use 1.5, although Paetz (2011) adopts a smaller value, 1. For 𝜔, micro data 
typically indicates a value in the range of 5 to 10 (Funke et al., 2010); and Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000) have shown that such high elasticity can explain an observed large 
home bias in trade. So we set it to be 6 at the beginning. However, Moons (2009) and 
Paetz (2011) use a value of 1 and 1.5 respectively for UK. We will analyze it further 
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in the section of robustness checks. 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 = 0.0005 is directly from Lafourcade and 
Wind (2012).  
Tax rates need to be pinned down by referring to specialized tax studies. In this 
paper, as in many other macroeconomics papers, the so called ―average effective tax 
rates (AETRs)‖, ―implicit tax rates‖ or ―tax ratios‖ are used to measure the effective 
overall tax burden from the major taxes and are consistent with the concept of 
aggregate tax rates at the national level and with the assumption of representative 
agent as well. Some estimation strategies have been proposed to ―combine 
information on various statutory tax schedules, tax returns and tax codes with data on 
income distribution, household surveys, and projections of real present values for 
investment projects in specific industries‖ (Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000), in order 
to provide suitable measure of aggregate taxation, AETRs. Mendoza et al. (1994) 
propose a method to compute aggregate tax rates for large industrial countries, and for 
UK their estimation is: 𝜏𝐶 = 0.14 , 𝜏𝐾 = 0.56 , and 𝜏𝐿 = 0.27  for the period 
1965-1988. Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) provide a different estimate for UK, 
and their calibration result is: 𝜏𝐶 = 0.2008, 𝜏𝐾 = 0.4071, and 𝜏𝐿 = 0.2844. In this 
paper we use the result of OECD. Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) study the tax 
systems of OECD countries and estimate average effective tax rates on capital, labour 
and consumption for these countries. According to their estimation, during the period 
of 1991-1997, UK has the following AETRs: 𝜏𝐶 = 0.169 , 𝜏𝐾 = 0.384 , and 
𝜏𝐿 = 0.21. In this paper, we do not consider the progressive property of the labour 
income tax, and just use the average rate. For the average tax rates on government 
bond interest and stock dividend, we cannot find professional and reliable studies. 
According to a website of UK government (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxon/uk.htm), in 
the year of 2012-2013 dividend tax rates are from the lowest 10% to the highest 
42.5%, depending on one’s overall taxable income; and tax rates on savings income 
are from 10% to 50%. Thus we use a relatively conservative value, 15%, to calibrate 
the average tax rates on bond interest income and dividend income, 𝜏𝐵  and 𝜏𝐷 . 
 
Table 4. Steady state values and ratios 
Value/Ratio Calibrated value Based on 
Π  0.03535 Data, average inflation rate 
𝛾𝐴 0.02383 Data, average real GDP growth rate 
𝑔 0.37990 Data, average government expenditure-GDP ratio 
𝑏 0.45490 Data, average government bond-GDP ratio 
𝐿 0.50 Faccini et al. (2011), Paetz (2011) 
𝑅𝑇𝐷  1/17.76 𝑅𝑇𝐷 = 1/𝜀, and 𝜀 = 17.76 
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑅  0.36604 Data, average fiscal revenue-GDP ratio 
𝑅𝑇𝐼 0.17459 Data, average investment-GDP ratio 
𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐶 0.38184 Data, average investment-consumption ratio 
𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷  13.6 (Average stock price-to-earnings ratio), an initial guess 
 
Besides above parameters, several steady state values and ratios need to be 
pinned down as well, since some coefficients of the log-linearized DSGE equations 
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rely on them. Table 4 gives the calibrated values for these steady state values and 
ratios. 
Since at the steady state, real GDP grows at the same rate as permanent 
technology, according to equation group (99), we use the average real GDP growth 
rate to calibrate the parameter 𝛾𝐴. Following Faccini et al. (2011) and Paetz (2011), 
we assume the equilibrium labour supply is 0.50, in order to ensure that the Frisch 
elasticity, 𝐿 / (1 − 𝐿),  is equal to 1. The ratio of dividend to GDP is set to 1/17.76, 
given the value of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods within one 
single country 𝜀. 𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷  denotes the steady state ratio of stock price to gross dividend, 
and is set to be 13.6 as an initial guess. Here in fact we implicitly assume that the 
stock market P/E ratio (price-to-net-earnings ratio) of UK is 16, and then the ratio of 
stock price to gross dividend is calculated as 16 times (1 − 𝜏𝐷). All other ratios in 
Table 2 are computed as the average values of the data. 𝑅𝑇𝑄 , stock price-GDP ratio at 
the steady state, is then computed as 𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷  times 𝑅𝑇𝐷 . The steady state capital 
stock-GDP ratio, 𝑅𝑇𝐾 , can be got by equation (53) and (54), given that other 
parameters are already known. 
 
4.3. Prior and posterior distributions 
 
Table 5 summarizes a detailed description of the prior distributions for some structural 
parameters in our DSGE model.  
 
     Table 5. Prior and posterior distributions  
 Prior distribution Posterior distribution 
Parameter Type  Mean St. dev. Mean Confidence  interval 
𝜌 beta 0.3 0.1 0.4413 [0.2110 0.6206] 
𝜃 beta 0.2 0.1 0.7033 [0.5897 0.8681] 
𝜌𝑎  beta 0.7 0.1 0.7071 [0.5586 0.8506] 
𝜌𝑄  beta 0.7 0.1 0.8397 [0.7437 0.9294] 
𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  beta 0.7 0.1 0.8000 [0.6588 0.9300] 
𝜌𝑃
∗  beta 0.7 0.1 0.7057 [0.5578 0.8602] 
𝜌𝑅 beta 0.7 0.1 0.8359 [0.5461 0.9755] 
𝜌𝐺  beta 0.7 0.1 0.7253 [0.6289 0.8183] 
𝜎𝑎  invg 0.01 2 0.0134 [0.0024 0.0330] 
𝜎𝑄  invg 0.02 2 0.0262 [0.0139 0.0378] 
𝜎𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  invg 0.10 2 0.0671 [0.0364 0.0962] 
𝜎𝑃
∗ invg 0.01 2 0.0142 [0.0104 0.0179] 
𝜎𝑅 invg 0.01 2 0.0104 [0.0036 0.0155] 
𝜎𝐺  invg 0.03 2 0.0393 [0.0304 0.0479] 
𝜎𝐴  invg 0.01 2 0.0160 [0.0040 0.0286] 
𝜎𝑃  invg 0.01 2 0.0122 [0.0090 0.0152] 
 
The parameter 𝜌, representing the weight of foreign good in the aggregate 
consumption, is an indicator of the degree of openness. It is bounded between zero 
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(autarky) and one (complete integration). The prior mean value is chosen to be 0.30, 
as in Moons (2009) and Paetz (2011), to indicate a relatively high home bias of 
international trade for the UK. For the Calvo price rigidity parameter 𝜃, we set its 
prior mean to be 0.20, which means that 20 percent of domestic firms cannot freely 
reset their prices within each year, and is equivalent to the circumstance that 50 
percent of domestic firms cannot freely reset their prices within each quarter. This is a 
common setting for the UK economy, such as in Faccini et al. (2011), Paetz (2011) 
and Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012). 
8
 Because 𝜌 and 𝜃 are both bounded by 
the unit interval [0, 1), we use beta distributions as their priors.  
There are six persistence parameters for AR(1) processes: 𝜌𝑎 , 𝜌𝑄, 𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗ , 𝜌𝑃
∗ , 𝜌𝑅, 
and 𝜌𝐺 . Following Funke et al. (2010), the prior means of these persistence 
parameters are all set to be a standard value 0.7, and they are all subject to a beta 
distribution with stand deviation equal to 0.1. Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) 
also adopt this kind of prior distribution for the Taylor rule parameter 𝜌𝑅. For the 
corresponding six parameters of standard deviations, we use inverse-gamma 
distributions as their priors according to the standard convention, such as in Smets and 
Wouters (2007), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), Castelnuovo and Nisticó (2010) 
and Lafourcade and Wind (2012). And their prior means are chosen based on trials 
with a very weak prior, while the degrees of freedom of the inverse-gamma 
distributions are equal to 2, which corresponds to a rather loose prior.
9
 𝜎𝐴  and 𝜎𝑃  
are the standard deviations of the innovations to the growth rates of stochastic 
permanent technology and trend aggregate price level respectively. Their prior means 
are both set to be 1%.  
The posterior distributions of the parameters on the UK sample are obtained by 
using Dynare’s MCMC algorithm. Two chains of 30, 000 draws are run, with the last 
70% retained. The scale used for the jumping distribution is set to a value consistent 
with an acceptance rate in the neighborhood of 25% to ensure that the tails of the 
distributions are correctly identified. According to the Brooks and Gelman diagnostics 
(see Appendix C2), convergence of the MCMC algorithm is well behaved.  
Table 5 provides the posterior distributions for the parameters, including the 
posterior means and 90% confidence intervals. Figure C4.1 and C4.2 in the appendix 
depict the prior and posterior distributions of the parameters listed in Table 5. Overall, 
these parameters seem to be well identified, given the fact that their posterior 
distributions are either not centered on the prior or they are centered but with a 
smaller dispersion implying high significance of the estimates. It is a common 
practice in Bayesian DSGE modeling to compare posteriors to priors as informal 
indicators of identification. However, this may be misleading, since priors can differ 
from posteriors even for unidentified parameters, as illustrated in Koop et al. (2011). 
Along the line of Iskrev (2010), identification analysis can be performed in Dynare 
toolbox and the result indicates that all the parameters of the benchmark model are 
identified. The picture in the Appendix C3 plots the measures of this kind of analysis, 
                                                           
8 For other countries, 𝜃=0.7 is often assumed in a quarterly model, such as in Christiano et al. (2005) for US, and 
in Genberg and Pauwels (2005) and Funke et al. (2010) for Hong Kong. 
9 For the degrees of freedom of the inverse-gamma distributions, we also tried +infinity rather than 2, and the 
Bayesian estimation results are similar.  
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where large bars imply strong identification, while low bars signal potential weak 
identification for the respective parameter.  
The degree of openness, 𝜌, has a posterior mean of 0.4413, indicating a medium 
degree of openness. 𝜃 = 0.7033 means that on average 70.33% of the firms in the 
UK cannot re-optimize the prices of their products within one year, showing a rather 
higher price rigidity compared with US (Christiano et al., 2005) or Hong Kong 
(Funke et al., 2010). All the six autocorrelation parameters have posterior means 
greater than 0.7, indicating strong persistence of these variables or shocks. Top three 
most persistent shocks are: the stock market shock, the nominal interest rate shock, 
and the shock to the foreign output gap. The estimated standard deviations of shocks 
can give us a first impression about their relative magnitudes and what kind of shocks 
are likely to drive the cyclical variations in the macroeconomic time series. Most 
volatile shocks include: the shock to the foreign output gap, the government spending 
shock, and the stock market shock. In the following sections we will further explore 
the driving forces of the UK business cycles, especially for fiscal aggregates.  
In order to judge whether or not our benchmark model fits the data well, 
one-step-ahead predictions can be implemented in the Bayesian estimation procedure. 
Figure C4.3 in the appendix shows the posterior mean of one-step-ahead predictions 
for the six time series explored by this paper.
10
 In general, our model fits the data 
well, except that the one-step-ahead prediction error for the stock price is sometimes 
big because of the high volatility of its actual time series. 
 
4.4. Signal extraction of structural fiscal balances 
 
As explained previously, the structural fiscal balance (𝑆𝐹𝐵𝑡) in this paper is defined as 
the difference between the trend level of nominal fiscal revenue and the trend level of 
nominal government expenditure; and to calculate trend government expenditure, we 
only adjust nominal government expenditure one-to-one to the cycle of aggregate 
price level. So we have: 
𝑆𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑡     − 𝐺𝑡    
𝐺𝑡   = exp[𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑡) −𝑁𝑡 ] 
And the trend level of fiscal revenue can be calculated as follows once we get a 
smoothed time series for its cyclical component (𝐹𝑅𝑡 ): 
𝐹𝑅𝑡     = exp[𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑅𝑡) − 𝐹𝑅𝑡 ]                   
So how to get the smoothed time series of the nominal aggregate fiscal revenue 
cycle (together with the aggregate price cycle) is the key to do the signal extraction of 
structural fiscal balances. We use the posterior means of the Bayesian estimation to 
pin down the whole model. Given the state space representation of our model, 
equation (51), the signal extraction of the fiscal revenue cycle can be done by using 
the Kalman smoother, demonstrated in Durbin and Koopman (2001). The smoothed 
time series we get for the cyclical component of fiscal revenue is depicted in Figure 5 
(the red line, ―Fiscal revenue cycle 1‖, is the fiscal revenue cycle obtained by the 
                                                           
10 For those five unstationary variables (terms of trade excluded), we first get the one-step-ahead predictions for 
their second-order differences, and then recover the one-step-ahead predictions for their levels.  
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elasticity-trend approach, as shown in Figure 2).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Smoothed time series of the fiscal revenue cycle (blue line) 
 
 
Fig. 6. The trend level of fiscal revenue (in logarithm) and structural fiscal balances 
(as a fraction of nominal GDP) 
 
Figure 6 depicts the trend level of fiscal revenue and structural fiscal balances (as 
a fraction of nominal GDP) extracted for the UK, as long as the time series for the 
cyclical component of fiscal revenue has been obtained already. 
 
4.5. Re-examine the stochastic trends: model comparison 
 
As shown previously, for the UK economy the growth rates of real GDP and GDP 
deflator are not stationary, so in the benchmark model we adopt a reasonable setting 
for two basic stochastic trends: an integrated random walk (or a smooth trend model). 
Thus we want to see, from an empirical point of view, whether our specification for 
the stochastic trends is superior to other alternative settings, such as the deterministic 
trend assumption in Smets and Wouters (2007) and drifted random walk assumption 
in many Bayesian DSGE papers, say, Lafourcade and Wind (2012). Table B1 in the 
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appendix gives the Bayesian estimation results of three alternative models together 
with the benchmark model, including posterior means of parameters and the log 
likelihood values of model variants. M1 is for deterministic trend model, M2 is for 
drifted-random-walk trend model, and M3 is for the model in which real GDP trend is 
a drifted random walk while aggregate price trend is an integrated random walk. Then 
equation (M1), (M2) and (M3) below replace equation (55) in the benchmark model. 
To make results comparable, the priors used in the estimations are exactly the same as 
the one used for the benchmark model, and the numbers of MCMC chains and draws 
for each chain are the same as well.  
 
𝐵𝐺𝐴 = 𝛾𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑀 = 𝛱 
                            (M1) 
   
𝐵𝐺𝐴 = 𝛾𝑡
𝐴 = 𝛾𝐴 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑀 = 𝛾𝑡
𝑃 = Π + 𝜂𝑡
𝑃
                      (M2) 
 
𝐵𝐺𝐴 = 𝛾𝑡
𝐴 = 𝛾𝐴 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴
𝐵𝐺𝑀 = 𝛾𝑡
𝑃 = 𝛾𝑡−1
𝑃 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑃
                     (M3) 
Bayesian inference allows a framework for comparing alternative and potentially 
misspecified models based on their marginal likelihood. To compare models (say, 
𝑀𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 and 𝑀𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) we calculate the Bayes factor 𝐵𝐹𝑖 ,𝑗  which is the ratio of their 
posterior likelihoods (𝐿(𝑦|𝑀𝑖) and 𝐿(𝑦|𝑀𝑗 )): 
𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐿(𝑦|𝑀𝑖)
𝐿(𝑦|𝑀𝑗 )
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐿𝐿 𝑦 𝑀𝑖 )
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐿𝐿 𝑦 𝑀𝑗  )
 
where 𝐿𝐿 𝑦 𝑀𝑖  is the log likelihood for model 𝑀𝑖 . To assess rival models, we can 
compute the model probabilities 𝑝1 , 𝑝2, …𝑝𝑛  for 𝑛 models, given Bayes factors. 
Since  𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1, we have that: 
𝑝𝑖 =  
1/ 𝐵𝐹𝑖,1  , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑝1 ∙ 𝐵𝐹𝑖,1  ,                 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 > 1
  
Table 6 gives the marginal log likelihood values and posterior model odds 
(probabilities) for the benchmark and three alternative models. The log likelihood for 
our benchmark model is greater than any of the alternatives, indicating the superiority 
of the benchmark model. The model odd of the benchmark model is about 83%, 
confirming that our benchmark specification (assuming an integrated random walk for 
both two basic stochastic trends) fits the date best. 
 
   Table 6. Marginal log likelihood values and posterior model odds 
Model Benchmark M1 M2 M3 
Log likelihood 308.82 298.22 304.01 307.21 
Model odds 0.8278 0.0000 0.0067 0.1655 
 
5. BUSINESS CYCLES AND STRUCTURAL FISCAL BALANCES 
 
5.1. Impulse response analysis 
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When we use the posterior mean of the Bayesian estimation to pin down the system 
linking the cyclical components of endogenous variables, it can be used to do the 
impulse response analysis, forecast error variance decomposition and historical shock 
decomposition. For impulse responses, we pay special attention to the time profiles of 
the fiscal revenue cycle to different exogenous shocks, since according to the 
definition in this paper the structural fiscal balances is mainly related to the fiscal 
revenue cycle and the cyclicality of real government expenditure is ignored. 
 
Fig. 7. Impulse responses of the fiscal revenue cycle (in percent) to one-percent 
shocks to the temporary technology 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡 , foreign output gap 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗ , foreign price gap 
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡 , nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡
2, and the government expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡 . 
 
Figure 7 depicts the orthogonalized impulse response functions
11
 of the fiscal 
revenue cycle to one-percent exogenous shocks. Other things equal, when there is a 
one-percent shock to the temporary technology, on impact there would be a 0.05% 
increase of aggregate nominal fiscal revenue. Two years later fiscal revenue will be 
0.32% above its trend level, and afterwards the fiscal revenue cycle decreases 
gradually to zero. The positive effect on fiscal revenue of the temporary technology 
shock is intuitive and consistent with the literature, because a positive technology 
shock will lead to an increase of GDP and thus an increase of tax base, for either 
consumption tax or production factors’ income taxes. The interesting phenomenon is 
that the short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to the technology 
shock is only 0.05%, which is much smaller than a conventional expectation (close to 
one). 
Figure 8 gives the impulse responses of the output gap to one-percent exogenous 
shocks. In fact, the short-run elasticity of the real GDP with respect to the technology 
shock is only 0.75, less than one. According to equation (41), a one-percent shock to 
the temporary technology will lead to a one-percent increase of real output, if both the 
capital stock and labor input would not fluctuate much. However, the optimization 
                                                           
11 In this paper exogenous shocks are not correlated, so there is no difference between orthogonalized impulse 
response functions and generalized impulse response functions (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). 
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behaviors of firms and households will result in an increase of investment and a 
decline of labor supply, in response to this positive technology shock (shown in 
Figure C4.4 in the appendix). And for our benchmark model here the labor supply 
cycle decreases much larger than the increase of the capital stock cycle. As a result, 
the real output responses less than one-to-one to the technology shock. Furthermore, 
the taxation system is nominally defined, and a real shock such as this one-percent 
technology shock may influence aggregate price levels such as GDP deflator and then 
influence nominal fiscal revenue. Figure C4.4 in the appendix shows that a 
one-percent temporary technology shock will lead to a 0.22% decrease of GDP 
deflator on impact. This is possible because: given the world’s total demand for the 
UK’s real GDP is unaffected much, the supply increase of the UK’s real GDP resulted 
from a positive technology shock will lead to a relatively cheaper price of the UK’s 
goods in the global market, indicating larger terms of trade if the foreign price does 
not change. This is explained by equation (43) and confirmed by the Figure C4.4 in 
the appendix. This negative response of GDP deflator to the technology shock, 
together with the decrease of labor supply in the short run, partly explains the very 
small short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to the technology 
shock.  
 
Fig. 8. Impulse responses of the output gap (in percent) to one-percent shocks to the 
temporary technology 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡 , the foreign output gap 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗ , the foreign price gap 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡 , 
the nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡
2, and the government expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡 . 
 
The responses of the fiscal revenue cycle to foreign shocks are exhibited in 
Figure 7 as well. The short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to the 
real GDP of the rest of the world is 0.50. According to equation (43), a positive shock 
to the foreign output gap is likely to increase the domestic real GDP and then 
domestic fiscal revenue. Given the value of the degree-of-openness parameter, 𝜌, 
which is 0.4413, a one-percent foreign output increase corresponds to about 0.44% 
increase of domestic real output, keeping domestic aggregate demand and terms of 
trade unchanged. However, Figure 8 shows that the short-run elasticity of the 
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domestic output with respect to the foreign demand shock is only 0.35, less than 0.44. 
This is because the terms of trade is also affected by this foreign demand shock. 
Intuitively, a positive foreign demand shock will lead to an increase of domestic 
goods’ price and then a lower level of the terms of trade. This nominal effect will 
result in a negative effect on the domestic output, shown by equation (43). Figure 
C4.5 in the appendix proves this transmission mechanism. On the other hand, a higher 
aggregate price level will push up the fiscal revenue which is nominally defined.  
The short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to the foreign 
goods price is 1.15. Here the foreign goods price is denominated in domestic currency, 
so its fluctuation can come from either exchange rate movement or the variability in 
the foreign goods price denominated in foreign currency. A positive shock to the 
foreign goods price also has two channels to affect the nominal fiscal revenue of the 
UK: one is the real channel through real output, and the other is the nominal channel 
through the aggregate price level. As we will explain, both of these two channels have 
positive effects on fiscal revenue in the short run and thus result in a relatively large 
short-run elasticity, 1.15. A positive shock to the foreign goods price will directly 
increase the terms of trade and thus the world’s demand for domestic output, since the 
domestic goods become relatively cheaper. Again equation (43) tells that this will lead 
to an increase of domestic GDP, confirmed by Figure 8 showing that the short-run 
elasticity of real output with respect to the foreign goods price is about 0.8. Since the 
import price increases, the aggregate price level of the UK economy will increase as 
well, shown by Figure C4.6 in the appendix. As a whole, both the increase of real 
GDP and the raise of the aggregate price level, resulted from the positive foreign price 
shock, will lead to an increase of nominal fiscal revenue.  
The short-run elasticity
12
 of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to the nominal 
interest rate is -4.39, which is negative and quite big in absolute value. However, the 
negative effect of this monetary policy shock is not persistent, and one year after the 
shock hitting the economy nominal fiscal revenue is only 0.3% below its trend level. 
The negative effect of a positive nominal interest rate shock is easy to understand: this 
contractionary monetary policy will suppress consumption and investment, and then 
lead to a reduction of real output. Figure 8 shows that the short-run elasticity of real 
output with respect to the nominal interest rate is about -2.2, indicating a strong 
contractionary effect on the real economy. Furthermore, the aggregate price level will 
decrease as a result as well, and this is why the nominal fiscal revenue will be reduced 
much in the short run. The non-persistence of the negative effect of monetary policy 
shock on fiscal revenue should be explained by the open-economy characteristic of 
the UK. The immediate disinflation effect of a positive monetary policy shock will 
push up the terms of trade, and this relative price effect will increase the world’s 
demand for domestic output to a certain degree and can avoid persistent declines of 
domestic real output and fiscal revenue. The transmission mechanism is clearly shown 
in Figure C4.7 in the appendix.
13
 A positive nominal interest rate shock is likely to 
                                                           
12 Here ―elasticity‖ is not defined in a conventional way, but defined as the ratio of the percentage change of 
nominal fiscal revenue to the level change (not the percent change) of nominal interest rate.  
13 The large response of the capital stock in the figure is caused by the large response of the investment. If one 
wants to achieve a smaller reaction of investment and capital stock, investment adjustment cost can be 
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raise the fiscal revenue from bond interest income in the short run, but our result 
proves that this positive effect seems to be very small.  
Figure 7 also shows that when the government expenditure-GDP ratio increases 
by 1% (it is equivalent to a 1% increase of nominal government expenditure, 
assuming nominal GDP keeps unchanged), nominal fiscal revenue will be 0.61% 
above its trend level on impact. Similarly to the monetary policy shock, the effect of 
the government spending shock is not persistent as well. One year later nominal fiscal 
revenue will be only about 0.2% above its trend level. To make clear of the 
transmission mechanism of the government spending shock, we first pay attention to 
the effect on the real output of the government spending shock. Figure 8 says that the 
immediate effect on the real output is slightly positive, indicating a small positive 
government spending multiplier in the short run; but afterwards the real output is 
always below its trend level, indicating a strong crowd-out effect of this expansionary 
fiscal policy. This can be also proved by the behavior of the investment cycle in 
Figure C4.8 in the appendix. Figure C4.8 depicts the responses of GDP-deflator 
inflation and aggregate-price inflation to this one-percent government spending shock 
as well. Initially the increase of the aggregate internal demand caused by the positive 
government spending shock will lead to an increase of domestic goods price (GDP 
deflator) and then the aggregate price. This positive nominal effect is persistent, and 
the aggregate price will continue to increase in the next five years. The increase of the 
aggregate price level will raise the nominal fiscal revenue. Nevertheless, the reduction 
of the terms of trade (shown in Figure C4.8), caused by the increase of domestic 
goods price, will lead to a decrease of real GDP (according to equation (43)) and then 
fiscal revenue. To conclude, a positive short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue to 
the government spending shock can be explained by a slightly positive short-run 
government spending multiplier together with the increase of aggregate price caused 
by this government spending shock. The non-persistence of the effect can be 
explained by the fact that in the medium term real output will be below its trend level 
due to two kinds of crowd-out effects generated by this government spending shock: 
it crowds out domestic investment in the medium term, and it pushes up the price of 
domestic goods and then crowds out foreign demand as well.  
An interesting result is that: a shock to the stock price gap has no effect on the 
nominal fiscal revenue. If we look at the policy and transition equation for the fiscal 
revenue cycle, given by equation (50), it is found that both the stock price gap and the 
shock to the stock price gap do not enter into the policy and transition function. This 
is consistent with the result of Funke et al. (2010). In the following section of 
variance decomposition analysis, we will see that the shock to the stock price gap 
explains the biggest part of stock price non-fundamental variation. But it has no effect 
on dividend. Equation (49) shows that the nominal dividend is determined by real 
output, real marginal cost, and the aggregate prices of domestic goods and final goods. 
Stock price cannot influence dividend in our model, and thus cannot influence the 
fiscal revenue from the dividend and the aggregate nominal fiscal revenue. 
Table 7 below summarizes all the above impulse response analysis for the UK 
                                                                                                                                                                       
incorporated into our benchmark model.  
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nominal fiscal revenue. 
 
Table 7. Summary of the impulse response analysis for nominal fiscal revenue 
 Impulse response properties 
Positive or negative effect Short run elasticity 
Shock to Temporary productivity positive 0.05 
Foreign output gap positive 0.50 
Foreign price gap positive 1.15 
Nominal interest rate negative -4.39 
Government spending positive 0.61 
Stock-price gap no effect 0.00 
 
5.2. Forecast error variance decomposition 
 
Forecast error variance decomposition is computed as in the VAR literature through a 
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the exogenous shocks. It is 
computed relative to the sum of the contribution of each shock to the forecast error 
(mean square error) of some endogenous variable, and all the contributions normally 
sum up to the aggregate variance of this variable.
 14
 When the shocks are correlated, 
the variance decomposition depends upon the order of the variables. However, in this 
paper all the exogenous shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated.  
 
Table 8. Forecast error (unconditional) variance decomposition (in percent) 
 Shocks 
Temporary 
productivity 
Stock 
price gap 
Foreign 
demand 
Foreign 
 price 
Interest 
rate 
Government 
spending 
𝐹𝑅𝑡  1.33 0 27.38 8.18 42.58 20.53 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  9.40 0 15.13 5.54 37.35 32.58 
Π𝐻 ,𝑡  7.47 0 19.59 14.23 28.96 29.75 
Π𝑡  3.19 0 8.36 63.41 12.35 12.69 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  4.46 0 16.02 7.79 19.88 51.84 
𝑄𝑡  0.48 85.1 0.34 0.50 5.69 7.88 
 
Table 8 lists the unconditional forecast error variance decompositions of several 
aggregate variables’ cyclical components. Our main interest is the variance 
decomposition of the nominal fiscal revenue cycle. Overall, the nominal interest rate 
shock is the major driving force of the fiscal revenue cycle, and more than 40% of its 
volatility is explained by this monetary policy shock. It is consistent with the biggest 
(in absolute value) short run elasticity of fiscal revenue with respect to the nominal 
interest rate, shown in Table 7. Table B2 in the appendix also shows the conditional 
forecast error variance decompositions of the fiscal revenue cycle for different 
forecasting horizons. When the forecasting horizon goes to infinity, the conditional 
                                                           
14 For detailed explanations and computation formulas of variance and historical decomposition in VAR models, 
refer to Canova (2007). 
38 
 
forecast error variance decomposition will converge to the unconditional one.  
The shocks to the foreign output gap and the government spending-GDP ratio 
play the second and third most important roles, and more than 20% of the volatility of 
the fiscal revenue cycle comes from each of these two shocks. Although the short run 
elasticities of fiscal revenue with respect to these two shocks do not have big absolute 
values, their estimated standard errors are the greatest two among all the shocks, 
given by Table 5. 
Since the UK is an open economy and the value of the parameter 𝜌 indicates a 
medium degree of openness, the foreign price shock should contribute to the variation 
of aggregate fiscal revenue. Indeed, about 8% of the variability in the fiscal revenue 
cycle can be explained by the foreign price shock. An interesting finding is that the 
shock to the temporary productivity has almost no contribution to the cyclical 
movement of the aggregate nominal fiscal revenue: it only explains 1.33% of the 
whole forecast error variance. Finally, the stock price shock plays no role in 
explaining the volatility of fiscal revenue.  
It is found that the temporary productivity shock does not contribute much to the 
variation of many aggregate variables’ cycles, as shown in Table 8. It only explains 
9.40% and 7.47% of the total forecast error variances of the output gap and the 
GDP-deflator inflation gap respectively. In our framework, the trends of aggregate 
variables (such as GDP and fiscal revenue) are stochastic themselves, and the 
stochastic permanent technology has already explained much of the variation in the 
data. So relatively the role of the temporary technology shock is weakened. 
For the forecast error variance decompositions of both the output gap and the 
GDP-deflator inflation gap, the nominal interest rate shock and the government 
expenditure shock are the biggest two contributors. These imply that monetary and 
fiscal policies in the UK play a big role in the business cycles of the real economy.  
Foreign shocks, including the shocks to foreign output and foreign goods price, 
are of a certain importance to explain the UK’s business cycles, except for the stock 
price fluctuation. Particularly, more than 50% of the fluctuation of the inflation gap 
owes to the foreign goods price shock. These results again are consistent with the 
open-economy characteristic of the UK economy. And not surprisingly, the fluctuation 
of the stock price gap is substantially driven by the stock price shock.  
 
5.3. Historical shock decomposition 
 
We turn to the historical contribution of each type of shock over the sample period for 
the UK. It this paper, while impulse responses trace out how the cyclical components 
of aggregate variables respond to various shocks and the variance decomposition 
measures the contribution of each shock to the variability of the cycles of aggregate 
variables, the historical shock decomposition describes the contribution of each shock 
to the deviations of the cycles of aggregate variables from their baseline forecasted 
paths. To be specific, the historical shock decomposition for the nominal fiscal 
revenue cycle is shown in Figure 9. It can be a fruitful exercise to analyze this 
historical shock decomposition, because it allows us to identify the main sources of 
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specific booms and recessions in the fiscal revenue cycle. 
 
       Fig. 9. Historical shock decomposition of fiscal revenue cycle 
 
Overall, the results in Figure 9 confirm our previous finding that the shocks to 
the nominal interest rate, foreign output and government spending are the three largest 
contributors in explaining the variability of the fiscal revenue cycle. Nevertheless, 
some new results show up. For example, while in the period 1986-1987 the shock to 
the foreign demand played the major role, in the period 2007-2008 the nominal 
interest rate shock was the dominant factor determining the fiscal revenue cycle. Table 
9 provides the historical shock decompositions of the fiscal revenue cycle in four sub 
periods when the fiscal revenue cycle glided down. We can see that: for the period 
1985-1987, the glide of the fiscal revenue cycle was mainly generated by the change 
in the realized foreign price shock: from a positive effect on fiscal revenue in 1985 to 
a negative effect in 1987. However, the big drop of the fiscal revenue cycle during the 
period 1990-1997 (from +9% to about -10%) was driven by both the nominal interest 
rate shock and the foreign demand shock.  
 
Table 9. Historical shock decomposition of the UK fiscal revenue cycle (percentage) 
Sub-period Observed  
change 
Contributions of various shocks 
𝑣𝑡
𝑎 𝑣𝑡
𝑄
 𝑣𝑔𝑎𝑝 ,𝑡
∗  𝑣𝑃,𝑡
∗  𝑣𝑡
𝑅 𝑣𝑡
𝐺 
1985-1987 -3.48 0.19 0 7.00 -5.76 -2.30 -2.64 
1990-1997 -19.80 1.48 0 -7.77 -0.43 -8.76 -3.68 
2001-2003 -4.23 -0.02 0 1.58 1.89 -9.01 1.41 
2008-2009 -7.26 -0.27 0 1.18 -0.53 -11.98 4.38 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Now we do some robustness checks to see whether the results above are sensitive or 
not to our calibration of some parameters, which are not part of the Bayesian 
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estimation result. 7 cases are considered as below:  
(1) The production function parameter 𝛼 is changed to be 0.64, following Dicecio 
and Nelson (2007). 
(2) The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, 𝜔, is changed 
to be a smaller value, 4.  
(3) The lump-sum tax feedback elasticity for government debt 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇  is set to be a 
larger number, 0.01. 
(4) The tax rates on consumption, capital rental income and labour income are altered 
to be the calibration result of Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) for the UK: 
𝜏𝐶 = 0.2008, 𝜏𝐾 = 0.4071, and 𝜏𝐿 = 0.2844. 
(5) The tax rates on bond interest income and dividend (𝜏𝐵  and 𝜏𝐷) are changed to 
be a greater rate, 20%. 
(6) The steady state ratio of stock price to gross dividend, 𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷 , is set to be a larger 
number, 17, equivalent to that the stock market P/E ratio (price-to-net-earnings 
ratio) is 20. 
(7) The steady state ratio of stock price to gross dividend, 𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷 , is set to be a smaller 
number, 11.9, equivalent to that the stock market P/E ratio is 14. 
 
For all these 7 cases, we re-do the Bayesian estimation of our model, and then 
use the corresponding posterior means to pin down the model. Three things interest us 
most: first, whether the smoothed time series of the fiscal revenue cycle we extract 
from the data are sensitive or not to the alternative calibrations; second, the impulse 
responses of the fiscal revenue cycle to various shocks are robust or not; and third, the 
variance decomposition (the contributions of each exogenous shock to the forecast 
error) of the fiscal revenue cycle is sensitive or not. In the appendix, Table B3 and B4 
respectively provide the Bayesian estimation results and the variance decomposition 
results for the benchmark model as well as 7 alternative settings. Figure C4.9 and 
C4.10 respectively show the smoothed time series of the fiscal revenue cycle we 
extract from the data and the impulse responses of the fiscal revenue cycle to various 
shocks. 
The Bayesian estimation results are quite similar, and the three most volatile 
shocks are always the shock to the foreign output gap, the government spending shock, 
and the stock market shock. For the forecast error variance decomposition, the 
following results are robust: (a) the shocks to the nominal interest rate, foreign output 
and the government spending are the three major contributors of the variation of the 
fiscal revenue cycle, and their contribution as a whole is about 90%; (b) the shock to 
the foreign price makes some contribution to the fluctuation of the fiscal revenue 
cycle, above 5%; (c) the shock to the temporary productivity is of very minor 
importance; and (d) the shock to the stock price gap explains nothing of the 
fluctuation of the fiscal revenue cycle.  
The smoothed time series of the fiscal revenue cycle extracted from the data, in 
general, are bounded within a narrow range around the benchmark result, except for 
case 5 which exhibits a certain deviation from the benchmark before the year 2000. 
In terms of the impulse responses of the fiscal revenue cycle to various shocks, 
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the results are quite robust shown by Figure C4.10, except that the short-run impacts 
of the temporary productivity shock differ from a negative impact to a positive one. 
As explained for the benchmark model, the response of real GDP to the technology 
shock is positive, but the response of GDP deflator to the shock is negative due to the 
immediate increase of aggregate supply. Therefore, the difference in the short-run 
impacts of the temporary productivity shock on nominal fiscal revenue can be easily 
explained by the relative size of these two effects: the positive real effect and the 
negative nominal effect. If the former is bigger, then the overall impact is positive. If 
the latter is bigger, the overall impact is negative.  
 
7. Public finances in the post Great Recession period 
 
During the current post Great Recession period, fiscal policy makers in many 
countries are confronted with a dilemma: on one hand, the slow recovery during the 
liquidity trap urges the government to adopt stimulating policies such as increasing 
the government expenditure; on the other hand, fiscal crisis or fiscal unsustainability 
exists and the government does not have enough fiscal space for doing this.  
For the UK, Figure 6 tells that: both the fiscal balances and the structural fiscal 
balances decreased a lot after 2007 and reached a level of about -8% of nominal GDP 
in 2009; and in 2011 the fiscal deficit was still about 6% of nominal GDP. Regarding 
the public finances for the UK in the post Great Recession period, several interesting 
questions can be asked: is it a suitable policy to increase the government expenditure? 
Is there a role for tax cuts? To evaluate these policy questions, we need to pay 
attention to their effects not only on real output but also on fiscal stance indicated by 
such as fiscal deficit, and government debt-GDP ratio, which reached a level of about 
82% of nominal GDP in 2011.  
Although we ignore the fluctuation of government expenditure when we define 
and calculate the structural fiscal balances in previous sections of this paper, we must 
take it into account when we discuss the consequence of a policy in a period of a high 
fiscal deficit and a high debt-GDP ratio, especially when we explore an expansionary 
policy in government spending. The primary fiscal deficit as a fraction of nominal 
GDP is defined as below: 
𝐹𝐷𝑡 = (𝐺𝑡 − 𝐹𝑅𝑡)/(𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) 
If the cyclical component of the primary fiscal deficit (as a fraction of nominal GDP) 
is defined as its deviation from its steady-state value, then we have the following 
log-linearized equation: 
𝐹𝐷𝑡 =  𝑓𝑟 − 𝑔 ∙  GAP𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡  −  𝑓𝑟 ∙ 𝐹𝑅𝑡 − 𝑔 ∙ 𝐺𝑡   
where 𝑓𝑟 and 𝑔  are the steady-state fiscal revenue-GDP ratio and government 
expenditure-GDP ratio, respectively.  
 
7.1. Monetary policy and zero lower bound of nominal interest rate 
 
As have been explained, an expansionary monetary policy (reducing the nominal 
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interest rate) has positive and strong short-run effects on both real output and nominal 
fiscal revenue in normal times, even though the effects are not persistent. However, in 
the post Great Recession period for the UK, it is not feasible to implement such an 
expansionary monetary policy, because the nominal interest rate has reached its zero 
lower bound already.  
Therefore, an unconventional monetary policy called quantitative easing (QE) or 
large-scale asset purchase program is employed to stimulate the economy in the UK, 
like in the US and the Euro area. Since there is no feature of QE in our benchmark 
model, we cannot provide insight of this unconventional monetary policy’s effect on 
fiscal stance here. We will focus on fiscal policies, including increasing the 
government spending and tax cuts, for the UK in the post Great Recession period.  
 
7.2. An expansion in government spending 
 
We have shown that: although the short-run elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with 
respect to the government spending is positive, this positive effect is not persistent 
due to two kinds of crowd-out effects generated by the increased government 
spending: it crowds out domestic investment in the medium term, and it pushes up the 
price of domestic goods and then crowds out foreign demand as well. As another 
result, in the medium term real output will also be below its trend level, although the 
immediate effect on the real output is slightly positive.  
Therefore, due to its strong crowd-out effect, an expansion in government 
spending is likely to deteriorate the fiscal stance (to enlarge the fiscal deficit and 
increase the debt-GDP ratio), and simultaneously harm the economic recovery (to 
make real output below its trend level) in the medium term. This is confirmed by the 
figure below. 
 
Fig. 10. Impulse responses of the output gap, the fiscal revenue cycle, the government 
expenditure cycle, the fiscal deficit cycle and the cycle of the government bond-GDP 
ratio to a positive one-percent shock to the government expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡 . 
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In spite of the positive effect of the government spending expansion on nominal 
fiscal revenue, the fiscal deficit will be expanded because the increase of nominal 
fiscal revenue is less than the increase of nominal government spending. 
Consequently, the government bond-GDP ratio is enlarged either, shown by Figure 10. 
Although five years after the government spending expansion, the fiscal deficit will 
be slightly below its steady-state level, it is overall not a suitable stimulating policy 
for the UK in the current post Great Recession period with a high fiscal deficit and a 
high debt-GDP ratio.  
On the contrary, cutting the government spending would be a good alternative 
policy, which will in the medium term improve the fiscal stance (lower fiscal deficit 
and lower government debt-GDP ratio) as well as benefit the economic recovery 
(higher real output), even though the real output will be negatively affected slightly on 
impact. 
 
7.3. Tax cuts 
 
Tax cuts can be analyzed in two dimensions: one is to reduce the tax rate of either 
consumption tax or production factors’ income taxes; the other is to reduce the 
lump-sum tax (can also be viewed as to increase the transfer to households). Since for 
our benchmark model the tax rates are fixed and are structural parameters determining 
the model’s steady state, cutting the tax rates will result in a transition from one steady 
state to another. We leave this for further studies, and mainly discuss the effect of 
cutting the lump-sum tax.  
In the benchmark model, there is no uncertainty about the lump-sum tax rule and 
it is given by equation (37). As dealing with the government spending shock in 
equation (36), we add a lump-sum tax shock (with no persistence) into equation (37) 
and then we have the following: 
LST𝑡 = 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 ∙  B𝑡−1 − GAP𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 +  GAP𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡
𝐿𝑆𝑇  
which replaces the seventh equation in Appendix A. By incorporating this new shock 
into the benchmark model, our results presented in previous sections will not change 
much and qualitatively unchanged at all.  
Figure 11 shows the impulse responses of the output gap, the fiscal revenue cycle, 
the government expenditure cycle, the fiscal deficit cycle and the cycle of the 
government bond-GDP ratio to a negative one-percent shock to the lump-sum 
tax-GDP ratio. On impact, the nominal fiscal revenue cycle is negative, which is 
reasonable since cutting the lump-sum tax (or increasing the fiscal transfer to 
households) will immediately reduce the nominal fiscal revenue. Meanwhile real 
output and government expenditure are nearly not affected in the short run. As a result, 
the fiscal deficit together with the government debt-GDP ratio will be deteriorated in 
the short run. In the medium term, both the economic recovery (indicated by the 
response of real output) and the government debt-GDP ratio will be deteriorated, 
while the fiscal deficit is improved to a very small and insignificant degree. To 
conclude, cutting the lump-sum tax is not an appreciate fiscal policy for the UK in the 
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current post Great Recession period, taking into account both the economic recovery 
and the fiscal stance improvement.  
 
Fig. 11. Impulse responses of the output gap, the fiscal revenue cycle, the government 
expenditure cycle, the fiscal deficit cycle and the cycle of the government bond-GDP 
ratio to a negative one-percent shock to the lump-sum tax-GDP ratio 𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑡 . 
 
On the contrary, increasing the lump-sum tax temporarily would be a suitable 
alternative, which will in the medium term improve the fiscal stance (lower the 
government debt-GDP ratio and nearly not affect the fiscal deficit) as well as benefit 
the economic recovery (increase real output), while the fiscal deficit will also be 
improved in the short run. However, the amplitude of the economy’s response to this 
temporary positive lump-sum tax shock is much smaller, especially compared to the 
case of a negative government spending shock. 
Generally speaking, for the UK economy it seems not an appropriate choice to 
adopt an expansionary fiscal policy by either increasing the government expenditure 
or cutting the lump-sum tax, in the current post Great Recession period. An 
expansionary fiscal policy will deteriorate the fiscal stance (higher government 
debt-GDP ratio or higher fiscal deficit) as well as harm the economic recovery in the 
medium term. On the contrary, a contractionary fiscal policy (cutting the government 
expenditure or a temporary increase of the lump-sum tax) will benefit both the 
economic recovery and the fiscal stance. Cutting the government spending is 
relatively more effective, and it alleviates both the domestic and external crowd-out 
effects generated by the government spending. 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we propose a new framework to extract structural fiscal balances from 
data consistently with the macroeconomic theory, and to analyze the relationship 
between public finances and business cycles. The UK economy is taken as an 
example. 
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The impulse response analysis reveals the basic relationship between aggregate 
fiscal revenue and business cycles. The transmission mechanism of various shocks’ 
effect on nominal fiscal revenue is explained by two main channels: the real channel 
through real GDP which can be viewed as the real tax base of fiscal revenue, and the 
nominal channel through the aggregate price level. Although in the medium term the 
response of nominal fiscal revenue to the technology shock is positive, the effect is 
not large, partly due to the less than one-to-one response of real output and the 
negative response of GDP deflator. Both of the foreign shocks, the shock to foreign 
demand and the shock to foreign goods price, have positive effects on fiscal revenue. 
An expansionary monetary policy shock (to lower nominal interest rate) would have a 
great positive short-run impact on nominal fiscal revenue, but the influence is not 
persistent because of the open-economy characteristic of the UK. An expansion in 
government spending can also increase nominal fiscal revenue to a certain degree, but 
the effect is not persistent as well due to two kinds of crowd-out effects generated by 
an increase of government spending: it crowds out domestic investment in the 
medium term, and it pushes up the price of domestic goods and simultaneously 
crowds out foreign demand. The shock to the stock price has no effect on fiscal 
revenue, since in our model stock price cannot influence nominal dividend and other 
aggregate variables from where the aggregate nominal fiscal revenue comes. 
The analysis of forecast error variance decomposition of the fiscal revenue cycle 
tells that: the shocks to the nominal interest rate, foreign output and the government 
spending are the three major contributors to the variation of the fiscal revenue cycle, 
and their contribution as a whole is about 90%; the shock to the foreign price makes 
some contribution to the fluctuation of the fiscal revenue cycle, above 5%; and the 
shocks to the temporary productivity and stock price are of very minor importance. 
Robustness checks are implemented, and the above results concerning the signal 
extraction, impulse responses and forecast error variance decomposition are robust.  
We discuss the public finances of the UK in the post Great Recession period 
when both the economic recovery and the fiscal sustainability should be taken into 
consideration. Generally speaking, it is not an appropriate choice to adopt an 
expansionary fiscal policy by either increasing the government expenditure or cutting 
the lump-sum tax. An expansionary fiscal policy will deteriorate the fiscal stance 
(higher government debt-GDP ratio or higher fiscal deficit) as well as harm the 
economic recovery in the medium term. On the contrary, a contractionary fiscal policy 
(cutting the government expenditure or a temporary increase of the lump-sum tax) 
will benefit both the economic recovery and the fiscal stance. Compared to a 
temporary increase of the lump-sum tax, cutting the government spending is relatively 
more effective and it alleviates both the domestic and external crowd-out effects 
generated by the government spending. 
Possible further extensions of this paper can be achieved in several ways. First of 
all, forecasting exercises of our framework can be done, especially for the forecasts of 
aggregate fiscal variables. Secondly, in our theoretical model we have not considered 
the bracket-creep effect of inflation on tax revenues. This issue is important in the 
field of public finances, since inflation alters the distributive properties of nominally 
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defined tax systems. If one can incorporate this issue into our DSGE model, he may 
find richer results of the inflation’s effect on fiscal revenue and structural fiscal 
balances. Last but not least, the zero lower bound of nominal interest rate and 
unconventional monetary policy can be introduced into our framework. In the last 
three years of our data sample, the nominal interest rate of the UK reached its zero 
lower bound. Then some unconventional monetary policy such as QE, rather than a 
Taylor-type interest rate rule, was implemented. One may ask: what is the effect of 
QE on fiscal revenue and structural fiscal balances?  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: the cyclical DSGE representation of the benchmark model: 
Π𝑡 = Π𝐻 ,𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙△ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡                           
GAP𝑡 =  1− 𝜌 ∙ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗ + 𝜌 ∙  𝜉 + 𝜔 ∙  1 − 𝜌  ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡         
𝐶𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝐶𝑡+1 −   1− 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡
2 −𝐸𝑡 Π𝑡+1                        
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼2 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝑄𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼2) ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝐷𝑡+1 −  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡
2 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑄
       
Π𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 Π𝐻,𝑡+1  + 
 1 − 𝜃 ∙  1− 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 
𝜃 ∙  𝜀 − 1 
∙  GAP𝑡 −𝐷𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡            
𝑅𝑡
2 =  1 − 𝜌𝑅 ∙  𝜑1 ∙ Π𝑡 + 𝜑2 ∙ GAP𝑡 + 𝜌𝑅 ∙ 𝑅𝑡−1
2 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑅       
  LST𝑡 = 𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 ∙  B𝑡−1 − GAP𝑡−1 −𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 + GAP𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  
 G𝑡 = 𝜌𝐺 ∙  G𝑡−1 − GAP𝑡−1 −𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 + GAP𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
𝐺  
B𝑡+1 =
𝑔
𝑏 ∙  1 + Π + 𝛾𝐴 
∙ 𝐺𝑡 +
1 + 𝑅
 1 + Π + 𝛾𝐴 
∙  B𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1
2   
−
𝑔 + 𝑏 ∙ (𝑅 − Π − 𝛾𝐴)
𝑏 ∙ (1 + Π + 𝛾𝐴)
∙ 𝐹𝑅𝑡                     
FR𝑡 =
𝜏𝐿 ∙ P𝐻,𝑡     ∙ GDP𝑡      
FR𝑡     
∙  GAP𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  +
(𝜏𝐷 − 𝜏𝐿) ∙ D𝑡   
FR𝑡     
∙ 𝐷𝑡 + 
(𝜏𝐾 − 𝜏𝐿) ∙ 𝑟 ∙ P𝑡 ∙ K𝑡   
FR𝑡     
∙  
𝑟𝑡
1 
𝑟
+ 𝑁𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡  +
𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅 ∙ B𝑡   
FR𝑡     
∙  
𝑅𝑡−1
2 
𝑅
+ 𝐵𝑡   
+
𝜏𝐶 ∙ P𝑡 ∙ C𝑡 
FR𝑡     
∙  𝑁𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡  +
LST𝑡      
FR𝑡     
∙ 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑡                  
 1 − 𝜏𝐾 ∙ 𝐸𝑡 𝑟𝑡+1
1  =  1 − 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑡
2 −𝐸𝑡 Π𝑡+1           
Y𝑡 =
C𝑡 
Y𝑡 
∙ 𝐶𝑡 +
I𝑡 
Y𝑡 
∙ 𝐼𝑡 +  1 −
C𝑡 
Y𝑡 
−
I𝑡 
Y𝑡 
 ∙  𝐺𝑡 −𝑁𝑡               
𝐾𝑡+1 =
1 − 𝛿
1 + 𝛾𝐴
∙ 𝐾𝑡 +
𝛾𝐴 + 𝛿
1 + 𝛾𝐴
∙ 𝐼𝑡                          
𝑊𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +
𝐿
1 − 𝐿
∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡                             
𝐷𝑡 = GAP𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡 − 𝜀 ∙ 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 − (𝜀 − 1) ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡                
2 
 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙  𝑊𝑡 −𝑁𝑡  +  1− 𝛼 ∙
𝑟𝑡
1 
𝑟
− 𝜖𝑡                   
GAP𝑡 =  1 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡                            
𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑎 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑎 ,𝑣𝑡
𝑎~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑎
2)  
Π𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡−1                                       
𝐾𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡 −
𝑟𝑡
1 
𝑟
 
𝑁𝑡 = 𝑃𝐹,𝑡 −  1 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡  
In the fourth equation above, we add a shock, 𝜂𝑡
𝑄
, to account for the high volatility in 
the stock price gap, following Funke et al. (2010). The high volatility of the UK stock 
price time series can be seen in Appendix C1. For identification, we need three more 
equations. We assume AR(1) processes for 𝜂𝑡
𝑄
, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗  and 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡  as below: 
𝜂𝑡
𝑄 = 𝜌𝑄 ∙ 𝜂𝑡−1
𝑄 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑄 ,𝑣𝑡
𝑄~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑄
2)                     
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗ ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑣𝑔𝑎𝑝 ,𝑡
∗ , 𝑣𝑔𝑎𝑝 ,𝑡
∗ ~𝑁(0, (𝜎𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗ )2) 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑃
∗ ∙ 𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑃,𝑡
∗ , 𝑣𝑃,𝑡
∗ ~𝑁(0, (𝜎𝑃
∗)2) 
The 24 equations above give a set of linear equations linking all the cyclical 
components of the model’s aggregate variables. 
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Appendix B: supplementary tables 
 
 
Table B1. Bayesian estimation results for benchmark and alternative settings of stochastic trends 
 Posterior means of models 
Parameter Benchmark M1 M2 M3 
𝜌 0.4413 0.6173 0.5025 0.5036 
𝜃 0.7033 0.5943 0.6131 0.7046 
𝜌𝑎  0.7071 0.8105 0.7349 0.7122 
𝜌𝑄  0.8397 0.8582 0.8592 0.8450 
𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  0.8000 0.8056 0.8301 0.7967 
𝜌𝑃
∗  0.7057 0.8919 0.7594 0.7180 
𝜌𝑅  0.8359 0.8843 0.9365 0.9414 
𝜌𝐺  0.7253 0.7456 0.7539 0.7567 
𝜎𝑎 0.0134 0.0238 0.0087 0.0092 
𝜎𝑄 0.0262 0.0277 0.0257 0.0263 
𝜎𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  0.0671 0.0643 0.0741 0.0619 
𝜎𝑃
∗ 0.0142 0.0272 0.0165 0.0152 
𝜎𝑅 0.0104 0.0160 0.0112 0.0100 
𝜎𝐺 0.0393 0.0389 0.0384 0.0384 
𝜎𝐴 0.0160  0.0189 0.0139 
𝜎𝑃 0.0122  0.0164 0.0120 
Log likelihood 308.82 298.22 304.01 307.21 
Note: M1 is for deterministic trend model, M2 is for drifted-random-walk trend model, and M3 is for the model in 
which real GDP trend is a drifted random walk while aggregate price trend is an integrated random walk. 
 
 
 
Table B2. Conditional forecast error variance decompositions for the fiscal revenue cycle and 
output gap (in percent) 
  
Horizon (year) 
Fiscal revenue cycle Output gap 
1 3 10 1 3 10 
Shocks 𝑣𝑡
𝑎  0.01 0.70 1.08 6.69 14.34 9.00 
𝑣𝑡
𝑄
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑣𝑔𝑎𝑝 ,𝑡
∗  27.62 28.52 28.34 41.62 32.52 17.03 
𝑣𝑃,𝑡
∗  6.65 8.59 8.52 11.20 8.44 6.00 
𝑣𝑡
𝑅  51.69 47.11 43.49 39.42 32.69 36.38 
𝑣𝑡
𝐺  14.02 15.07 18.57 1.07 12.01 31.58 
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 Table B3. Bayesian estimation results for robustness checks 
 Posterior means of the models 
Parameter Benchmark R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
𝜌 0.4413 0.3961 0.4414 0.4049 0.3636 0.5892 0.4165 0.4016 
𝜃 0.7033 0.7045 0.7592 0.7475 0.7085 0.6570 0.7259 0.7464 
𝜌𝑎  0.7071 0.7031 0.7168 0.7122 0.7050 0.7033 0.7129 0.7097 
𝜌𝑄  0.8397 0.838 0.8304 0.8311 0.8395 0.8539 0.8393 0.8288 
𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  0.8000 0.8021 0.7692 0.7709 0.7797 0.82110 0.7864 0.7685 
𝜌𝑃
∗  0.7057 0.7249 0.7115 0.6965 0.7020 0.7045 0.7015 0.6966 
𝜌𝑅  0.8359 0.8778 0.7849 0.815 0.8095 0.9273 0.8327 0.8026 
𝜌𝐺  0.7253 0.7406 0.7155 0.7167 0.7241 0.7527 0.7203 0.7154 
𝜎𝑎 0.0134 0.0136 0.0199 0.0187 0.0132 0.0061 0.0163 0.0197 
𝜎𝑄 0.0262 0.0249 0.0256 0.0262 0.0249 0.0273 0.0248 0.0267 
𝜎𝑔𝑎𝑝
∗  0.0671 0.0743 0.0527 0.0642 0.0645 0.0655 0.0667 0.0641 
𝜎𝑃
∗ 0.0142 0.0146 0.0139 0.0142 0.0146 0.0137 0.0141 0.0142 
𝜎𝑅 0.0104 0.0089 0.0089 0.0095 0.0086 0.0136 0.0104 0.0094 
𝜎𝐺 0.0393 0.0384 0.0395 0.0388 0.0391 0.0383 0.0393 0.0394 
𝜎𝐴 0.0160 0.0146 0.0169 0.0158 0.0160 0.0130 0.0162 0.0180 
𝜎𝑃 0.0122 0.0118 0.0121 0.0120 0.0120 0.0130 0.0122 0.0121 
Note: R1, R2… R7 denote seven alternative calibrations of the model, for robustness checks. 
 
 
 
Table B4. Robustness checks: forecast error variance decompositions of the fiscal 
revenue cycle (in percent) under the benchmark and 7 alternative settings 
Different 
Settings of 
the model 
Shocks to 
Temporary 
productivity 
Stock 
price 
Foreign 
demand 
Foreign 
price 
Interest 
rate 
Government 
spending 
Benchmark 1.33 0.00 27.38 8.18 42.58 20.53 
𝛼 = 0.64 1.25 0.00 25.99 7.90 42.08 22.79 
𝜔 = 4 4.23 0.00 21.33 6.91 28.95 38.58 
𝜀𝐿𝑆𝑇 = 0.01 2.78 0.00 22.76 9.45 38.85 26.17 
𝜏𝐶 = 0.201, 
𝜏𝐾 = 0.407, 
𝜏𝐿 =0.284 
1.64 0.00 19.10 8.83 38.79 31.64 
𝜏𝐵 = 0.20, 
𝜏𝐷 = 0.20 
0.36 0.00 33.04 5.71 52.52 8.36 
𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷 = 17 1.89 0.00 23.76 8.14 43.85 22.35 
𝑅𝑇𝑄𝐷 = 11.9 3.13 0.00 22.48 9.51 36.93 27.95 
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Appendix C: supplementary figures 
 
 
Appendix C1: data plot 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C2: multivariate Brooks and Gelman diagnostics 
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Appendix C3: identification of the benchmark Bayesian DSGE model 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C4: other figures 
 
 
Fig. C4.1. Prior vs. posterior distributions in the Metropolis-Hastings procedure: part 
1 (dashed grey line: prior; solid black line: posterior; vertical green line: posterior 
mean) 
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Fig. C4.2. Prior vs. posterior distributions in the Metropolis-Hastings procedure: part 
2 (dashed grey line: prior; solid black line: posterior; vertical green line: posterior 
mean) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. C4.3. Fit of the benchmark model: dashed red lines are the posterior mean of 
one-step-ahead predictions, and solid black lines are the actual data (in logarithm). 
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Fig. C4.4. The transmission of the temporary technology shock: impulse responses of  
the investment cycle, the capital stock cycle, the labor supply cycle, the GDP-deflator 
inflation cycle and the terms of trade cycle to a one-percent temporary technology 
shock.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. C4.5. The transmission of the foreign demand shock: impulse responses of the 
terms of trade cycle, GDP-deflator inflation cycle and the inflation gap to a 
one-percent foreign output shock.  
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Fig. C4.6. The transmission of the foreign price shock: impulse responses of the terms 
of trade cycle, the inflation gap, and the GDP-deflator inflation cycle to a one-percent 
foreign price shock.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. C4.7. The transmission of the monetary policy shock: impulse responses of 
consumption, capital stock, labor supply, the inflation gap and the terms of trade to a 
one-percent nominal interest rate shock.  
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Fig. C4.8. The transmission of the government spending shock: impulse responses of 
the investment cycle, the GDP-deflator inflation cycle, the inflation gap, the terms of 
trade cycle to a one-percent government spending shock.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. C4.9. The smoothed time series of the fiscal revenue cycle under different 
calibration settings for robustness checks: benchmark model and 7 alternative settings 
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Fig. C4.10. Impulse responses of the fiscal revenue cycle (in percent) to one-percent 
shocks to the temporary technology 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑡 , the foreign output gap 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∗ , the foreign 
price gap 𝑃𝐹,𝑡 , nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡
2, and the government expenditure-GDP ratio 
𝑔𝑡 , under different calibration settings for robustness checks: benchmark model and 7 
alternative settings 
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